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Tiivistelmä: 
Käsittelen Pro Gradu tutkielmassani vähemmistöosuuksien hankintoja Euroopan 
Komission Valkoisen Kirjan (COM (2014) 449 final) valossa. Valkoisen kirjan mukaisesti 
Komissio ehdottaa uutta kohdennettua avoimuusjärjestelmää, jonka avulla kilpailuhaittoja 
aiheuttavat vähemmistöosuushankinnat saatettaisiin EU:n Sulautuma-asetuksen piiriin. 
Tutkielmani tavoitteena on osoittaa, miten kilpailuhaittoja aiheuttavat 
vähemmistöosuuksien hankinnat on mahdollista estää nykyisen lainsäädännön avulla. 
Teen aluksi lyhyen katsauksen sulautumien valvonnan historiaan, jonka jälkeen keskityn 
tärkeisiin käsitteisiin, kuten määräysvalta ja yhteenliittymä, jotka ovat tärkeitä termejä 
jotka muodostavat Sulautuma-asetuksen ytimen. Tämän jälkeen suoritan katsauksen 
nykyiseen lainsäädäntöön ja tutkin sen mahdollisuuksia säännellä ja estää haitalliset 
vähemmistöosuuksien hankinnat. 
Tämän jälkeen käyn läpi tapauksia koskien vähemmistöosuuksien hankintoja sekä suoritan 
oikeusvertailua kohdennetun avoimuusjärjestelmän ja Saksassa, Isossa-Britanniassa ja 
Yhdysvalloissa voimassa olevien järjestelmien välillä. Lopuksi paikallistan ehdotetun 
kohdennetun avoimuusjärjestelmän heikkoudet ja esittelen vaihtoehtoisia ratkaisuja 
kyseisen järjestelmän parantamiseksi. 
 
 
Tutkielmani johtopäätökset ovat, että Komissio on jo nykyisen lainsäädännön valossa 
tarvittavat työkalut tarkastella vähemmistöosuuksien hankintoja EU:n Sulautuma-
asetuksen ja SEUT 101 ja 102 artiklojen avulla. Komission tulisi selkeyttää ohjeistustaan 
ja ennemmin kuin lisätä sääntelyä Komission tulisi antaa ohjeistusta vähemmistöosuuksien 
hankinnoista. Lopuksi teen parannusehdotuksia kohdennettuun avoimuusjärjestelmään sen 
varalta, että Komissio saattaisi kyseisen järjestelmän voimaan. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In my thesis I will dive into the world of Competition law and EC Merger Regulation and 
try to explore and locate the minority shareholdings possession in this context. We will see 
how acquisitions of minority stakes are effecting to the competition and what kind of 
competitive effect they have to the market. The aim of my thesis is to find out whether or 
not todays legislation is suitable for capturing problematic acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings, and if not, explore alternative and more suitable solutions than the White 
Paper is proposing to block the gap these acquisitions are creating in the EC Merger 
Control. 
First in Chapter 2, I will present a short survey of the history of Merger Regulation, after 
which I will focus on important concepts such as control and concentration, which are 
essential terms when talking about Merger Regulation and acquisitions of minority 
shareholding. The basic idea of the EC Merger Regulation is formed around the acquisition 
of the control where acquirer has possibility to use decisive influence on a lasting basis. 
I will then present an overview of how the acquisitions of minority shareholdings can 
already be overseen under the binding jurisdiction (ECMR and Article 101 and 102 of the 
TFEU), what possible anti-competitive concerns these existing solutions may raise, and 
whether they may have some efficiency-enhancing effects. 
In Chapter 5, I will go through few cases concerning the acquisition of minority 
shareholding, The most important of them being the attempt by Ryanair to take over one of 
its competitors, Aer Lingus which in my opinion was the benchmark and impetus for the 
White Paper’s proposals. 
In Chapter 6, I will introduce the propositions of White Paper (Targeted Transparency 
System) and compare the promulgation process to the Commission’s earlier Merger 
Simplification project, whose implementation did not go by the book. 
After that, in Chapter 7, I will compare the proposed system to the jurisdiction of 
Germany, United Kingdom and the USA where the acquisitions of minority shareholding 
are already captured under the Merger Regulation.  
2 
 
Finally, in Chapters 8 and 9, I will focus on the weaknesses of the proposed system and 
propose alternative solutions to clarify the jurisdiction in lius of a massive and expensive 
legislation process. I will also present my suggestion to clarify the targeted transparency 
system in case the propositions of the White Paper should come to pass. 
 
 Minority Shareholding 1.1.
 
The simplest, most basic example of minority shareholding or partial ownership is when a 
person or entity owns less than 50 % of the voting rights attached to the equity of another 
undertaking.1 Minority shareholding in another undertaking can lead to anti-competitive 
effects which need to be taken into account while investigating the acquisitions. Anti-
Competitive effects can be either coordinated or unilateral. Coordinated effects can be 
express or tacit. When talking about anti-competitive effects in mergers, we have to 
evaluate the concept of control, which one undertaking gains after acquiring a minority 
shareholding in another undertaking. Control over another undertaking has to be decisive 
and on a lasting basis so that the Commission can investigate the concentration that occurs 
as a result of the merger. The next thing we have to pay attention to is the term 
concentration and how it is defined in the EC Merger Regulation. If the merger forms 
concentration in the meaning of EC Merger Control, we may then move to the concept of 
control which can appear in the legal or actual content and it can be sole or joint.  
Both Sole and joint control can be categorized into their passive and active forms. After 
defining these terms, we can begin to ask if any of these criteria are in effect at the same 
time.  Concentration occurs when control (legal or actual, joint or sole, passive or active) 
has been acquired on a lasting basis, and when the ability to use the decisive influence is 
real. According to the Article 8 section 4 of the EC Merger Regulation, these criteria 
determine whether the Commission may step in and forbid the merger.  
The evaluation of the Commission regarding concentration – whether it should be notified 
or it should be forbidden – is always valuated case by case. If the concentration does not 
fall in to the scope of EC Merger Control, the acquisition of minority shareholding can also 
be measured under the Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The problem with Article 101, which 
                                                 
1 OECD Policy Roundtable concerning minority shareholdings (2008), page 20 
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forbids agreements restricting competition, hinges on the question of whether the 
acquisition of minority shareholding forms agreement. Article 102 forbids the abuse of the 
dominant position and the problem is that Article 102 only captures cases where dominant 
position is acquired, which is not the case in acquisitions of minority shareholding. 
Overall, it has been shown in the OECD’s roundtable discussions that acquisitions of 
minority shareholdings can have certain anticompetitive effects. First, minority 
shareholding in a competitor can lead to reduction of output and increase of prices to the 
detriment of consumers’ welfare. They can also lead to a coordinated effects in the market, 
such as increasing transparency, that can affect the firms’ incentives to compete. Anti-
competitive effects are often shown in the oligopolistic markets with significant barriers to 
entry. Risks of the aforesaid effects arise from both passive and active minority 
shareholding among competitors. Some of the concerns associated with structural links 
between competitors can be addressed by merger control jurisdiction while others might 
require intervention under the competition rules on dominance (in the EU Article 102 of 
the TFEU) or competition rules on restrictive agreements between competitors (in the EU 
Article 101 of the TFEU).2 
The Commission is right that there is a gap in the legislation and at the moment the 
Commission is not able to investigate acquisition of minority shareholding, but then again 
is it really a gap which should be blocked and does it really have that huge impact to the 
big picture. After all, the number of potentially harmful cases of acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings is limited and the process (targeted transparency system) is quite 
burdensome compared to what may be gained through the proposed system. Therefore I do 
not see a reason to start massive and expensive legislation process. Instead, the 
Commission could try to make the existing tools more effective by clarifying the Merger 
Guidelines and Jurisdictional Notice or even create totally new “Guidelines on the 
Acquisition of Minority Shareholdings”3. 
 
 
                                                 
2 OECD Policy Roundtable concerning minority shareholdings (2008), pages 19-20 
3 Ratliff – Louis – O’Daly 2014, page 2 
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 Research Problem 1.2.
 
The central question posed in my thesis is this: Do the acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings create such a gap that they give rise to anticompetitive concerns, and do they 
threaten the balance protected by the competition law, especially EC Merger Regulation?  
Acquisitions of minority shareholdings have been in discussions for over a three decades 
now and in that time EU and the Commission have basically built the edifice of Merger 
Regulation that is in force today. In my thesis, I want to elaborate on acquisitions of 
minority shareholding and place them in the legal framework in force today. I will also 
question whether a new legislation is needed to block the possible gap created by existing 
EC Merger Regulation. I will analyze such gaps in recent history to see if this is really 
something that the Commission should allocate its resources to, as proposed in its White 
Paper4. I will also analyze the proposed targeted transparency system and propose some 
improvements which, if the system would be enforced, will make it more functional from 
the viewpoint of stakeholders. 
 
 Approach, Theoretical Framework and Method 1.3.
 
Approach: I have taken the approach of a private stakeholder so I partly criticize the 
proposed system but still introduce a more objective view of the topic from the 
Commission viewpoint. In order to have the most effective and balanced system in place it 
is necessary to define the problem behind the acquisitions of minority shareholdings and 
find the solution which is satisfactory for all of the parties. Therefore I will define the 
concept of control in concentration that comes into play when minority shareholding is 
acquired. To define such concepts also requires an approach to the subject that takes into 
account economic theory. However due to the limited space I will take more of a legal 
approach to the subject and not dive too deeply into the economic theories behind the 
subject, which are still worth to mention on a general level. 
                                                 
4 COM (2014) 449 final, European Commission’s White Paper: “Towards more effective EU merger control, 
Brussels, 9.7.2014 
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Theoretical framework: My theoretical framework consists of European and Competition 
law. I have researched the Merger Regulation in Europe and United States as a background 
for my thesis. Most of the sources I have used in my thesis have both legal and economical 
approaches, from which I will concentrate more on the former. We have to remember that 
Merger Regulation is not just something that was invented to make multinational 
undertakings difficult, but in the end to protect consumer welfare and minimize the impact 
to all of parties involved. When a freedom of contract turns to a pure instrument of the 
stronger party to exercise power, it can be said that the spirit of contract law has turned 
against itself and at the same time against common interests5. My theoretical framework 
includes research, among the EU’s Competition Law, from the United States Competition 
Law and national Competition laws of the member states of the EU to compare the systems 
in place all over the globe. 
Method: The method that is used in my thesis is legal dogmatic, in other words 
jurisprudence, which aims to interpret the legal rules and systematization of provisions of 
law. These methods have both a practical and theoretical scope, with their own individual 
methods that nevertheless can be applied in close interaction with each other.6 Theoretical 
jurisprudence aims to open and answer the abstract possibilities and questions that the 
practical jurisprudence faces in real context.7 My thesis is a combination of theoretical and 
practical jurisprudence since it opens the theoretical framework behind the concept of 
control in concentrations and acquisitions of minority shareholdings, while trying to open 
these theoretical concepts through practice. This can be seen as an effort to explain how 
these concepts affect actual practice. In my thesis, I will first open the theoretical 
framework of the concepts, then go through the case law related to the acquisitions of 
minority shareholdings and attempt to explain the same through practical framework. This 
practical framework will consist of recent case history – Ryanair’s attempted acquisition of 
its competitor Aer Lingus being the most important. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Pöyhönen 1997, page 255 
6 Aarnio 1997, pages 36-37 
7 Aarnio 1997, page 53 
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 European Commission’s White Paper and its backgrounds 1.4.
 
The Commission’s objective is to create system that would allow them to examine and 
intervene against potentially anti-competitive acquisitions of non-controlling minority 
shareholdings. From the results of Public Consultation8 in 2013, it can be read that 
Member States and other stakeholders would want a system which captures the potentially 
problematic cases while avoiding any unnecessary administrative burden on companies, 
which has been the goal of the Commission for the last 6 years.9 Administrative burden on 
companies can also be seen as the biggest threat of the proposed legislation. 
Three options for the new system were introduced based on the Public Consultation10 in 
2013, which are: 
- Notification system: This system would extend the current system of ex-ante 
merger control to acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholding under 
certain conditions. 
- Transparency system: Would require parties to submit an information notice to 
inform the Commission of such acquisition. After that, the Commission could 
decide whether to further investigate the transaction, enable the Member States to 
consider a referral request, and enable potential complainants to come forward. 
-  
- Self-assessment system: Would not require parties to notify such acquisitions in 
advance of completion. The Commission could still initiate an investigation of 
potentially problematic cases on the basis of its own market intelligence or 
complaints. 
The best option, which was also in favor of most of the private stakeholders in the public 
consultation, is a combination of two last options: Self-assessment system with a 
possibility to voluntarily give notification to the Commission, without a stand-still 
obligation to create legal certainty. United Kingdom also preferred this kind of system, 
which would be similar with United Kingdom’s own national system. Therefore the 
                                                 
8 SWD (2013) 239 final: Commission Staff Working Document, Towards more effective EU merger control 
9 SWD(2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, pages 22-23 
10 SWD (2013) 239 final: Commission Staff Working Document, Towards more effective EU merger control, 
pages 6-7 
7 
 
Commission introduced a new option called targeted transparency system in which I will 
focus in section 6.2.11 
 
1.4.1 What is the Purpose of the new legislation and why we are about to adopt it? 
 
In the background material of the White Paper, the Commission introduced five 
assessment criteria to measure the three different systems introduced above. First is a goal 
to prevent harm to competition and consumers; second is to create legal certainty; third is 
to lessen administrative burden on businesses; fourth is the amount of the public 
Enforcement costs; and fifth is consistency with the merger control systems at national and 
EU level and allocation to the more appropriate authority.12 
The first goal sought to ensure effective competition in the internal market and prevent 
harms to customers by capturing the potentially problematic cases. The Commission has 
estimated that the benefits derived from the horizontal merger decisions are between 4000 
and 6000 million euros per year between years 2009 - 201113. In 2012 the Commission 
estimates to gain 2,200 – 5,600 million euros per year from horizontal merger decisions. 
These estimates don’t apply directly to the proposed targeted transparency system since it 
would not be possible to assume a similar rate of intervention for minority shareholding 
cases than there are acquisitions of control. The Commission is expecting the rate to be 
higher. 14 
Legal certainty – in the other words, whether the proposed options are clear and precise – 
is the second criteria. In the public hearings legal certainty of the proposed system has 
raised a lot of concerns. It is clear that stakeholders, especially law firms, regard legal 
certainty as very important value so that they can be sure under which conditions and at 
what point transactions can be fully implemented. 
                                                 
11 SWD (2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, page 23 
12 SWD (2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, pages 28-31 
13 Due to a limited space, I will not focus on these estimations more precisely. Read more about the 
estimations from the Annual activity reports of DG COMP 2009-2011. 
14 SWD (2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, paragraph 74. More detailed of the estimation, please see the 
Annual Activity report of DG COMP 2012. 
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The third criteria, and at the same time a big issue, is the administrative burden on 
businesses. this includes costs incurred by businesses to meet legal obligations to 
participate in procedures and to provide information. This can be seen problematic due to a 
limited number of problematic cases. The Commission focused only on the external costs 
of notification, but what about the internal costs? Transactions often involve a huge 
number of employees of the parties of the merger, not to mention the external legal and 
financial advisors, so it would have been good to also evaluate the internal costs of the 
parties while measuring the criteria.15 
The fourth criteria assesses whether an option affects competition authorities and the 
Commission by increasing or decreasing workload. The fifth and last criteria assesses if the 
options fit with the existing procedures at the EU and Member State level.16 
Based on the evaluation of the assessment criteria, the Commission concluded that the 
targeted transparency system would be most beneficial by meeting all of them. The 
Commission states that under this system, the potential harmful transactions will be caught, 
“innocent” transactions will be left out, the number of harmful cases will be limited, and 
harm to consumers prevented. Targeted transparency system also limits the administrative 
burden on businesses and enforcement costs for the public authorities involved, by limiting 
the amount of submitted information. Finally the Commission stated that the system would 
fit in with the existing systems on the national level.  
The Commission also saw that the targeted transparency system would respect the 
principle of subsidiarity, since there have been few cases17 that would have been more 
appropriately investigated by the Commission instead of by individual Member States, due 
to a dimension that did not go beyond the borders of a particular Member State.18  
The Commission invited stakeholders to comment the White Paper by 3 of October 2014 
and will decide, based on the public hearing, what actions it will take to block the possible 
gap of the acquisition of minority shareholdings. The Commission has not yet published a 
                                                 
15 SWD (2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, section 3.4.1.3 
16 SWD (2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, pages 30-31 
17 For example case Ryanair / Aer Lingus. See more about these cases in section 5.1 
18 SWD (2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, pages 35-36 
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summary of the results of the hearing. Some of the shareholders have already published 
their responses to which I will focus later in my thesis. 
 
2. History of the merger regulation within EU 
 
The goal of the EU merger regulation is to ensure effective competition in the internal 
market or parts of it. Its general obligation is to ensure effective competition in the 
markets. When one undertaking has to capitulate to agreements or other arrangements it 
has made with another undertaking that are heavily restrictive or disturb competition, the 
market does not receive the benefits of their content. It is a question of the maintenance of 
the effective markets based on restriction of the abuse of property law's rights which 
appears in the form of the restriction of the abuse of the dominant position. 19 Merger 
regulation is not a new invention and EC Commission has already in 1966 identified two 
categories: concentrations and co-operations (cartel type arrangements)20. Even back then 
the concentrations were said to result from structural chance in a manner indicating 
permanence21. EU has paid attention to the control of concentrations between undertakings 
since 1989 and has reviewed the system several times. EU has reformed the merger 
regulation in 1997 and 2004. Before the enactment of the EC Merger Regulation in 1989, 
the Commission applied the Philip Morris22 standard for minority acquisition. According to 
ECJ the Article 81 (101 TFEU) applies to the acquisition of minority shareholdings in a 
competitor and serves as an instrument for influencing the commercial conduct of the 
parties so as to restrict or distort competition23. After the EC Merger Regulation came into 
force the role of the Philip Morris standard has been diminished.24 
 
                                                 
19 Pöyhönen 2000, page 83 
20 Memorandum on the Problem of Concentration in the Common Market (1966), EEC Competition Series, 
Study No. 3,  
21 Verloop 1993, page 202 
22 Cases 142/84 and 156/84, British American Tobacco Company Limited and R.J. Reynolds Industries Inc. 
v. E.C. Commission, before the Court of Justice of the European Communities [1987] ECR 4487; [1988] 4 
CMLR 24, Phillip Morris tried to acquire 30,8 % share of Rothmans, its rival in the cigarette market. 
Ownership was reduced to 24,9 % and the ECJ stated that what may look like a passive investment may 
result in a takeover of a competitor.   
23 Milanesi 2002, page 15 
24 Gilo – Ezrachi 2008, page 339 
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 Reform of the Merger Regulation on 2004 2.1.
 
Reform of the Merger Regulation in 2004 was based on the Green Paper25 and its 
investigations on 2001. The Green Paper Commission discussed, in reference to other 
subjects, the potentially complex acquisitions of minority shareholdings, so the topic has 
been in spotlights for over a decade now. It was noted back then that the number of the 
possible problematic transactions was limited and that articles 101 (81 EC) and 102 (82 
EC) of the TFEU can be used to assess these cases and competition problems through case 
law. The Commission even stated in its 2001 Green Paper that it: “appears that only a 
limited number of minority shareholdings would be liable to raise competition concerns 
that could not be satisfactorily addressed under Articles 81 and 82 (nowadays 101 and 102 
of the TFEU)… Under this assumption it would appear disproportionate to subject all 
acquisitions of minority shareholdings to the ex-ante control of the Merger Regulation”. 26 
As a conclusion Article 101 (81) remained the most appropriate instrument for the 
assessment for divestment of minority shareholdings. 
 
 Competence of the European Commission on the light of the fundamental rights 2.2.
 
In its White Paper, the European Commission states that the scope of its jurisdiction relates 
directly to which procedure is appropriate and adequate.27 This leads us straight to the 
question: on what basis does the European Commission have the right to widen its 
competence to investigate also acquisitions of minority shareholdings, which very rarely 
incur competition concerns? The Commission’s right to investigate unproblematic 
transactions would create a heavy burden on businesses and make the Merger Regulation 
more uncertain and lessen its predictability. 
                                                 
25 COM(2001) 745 final: Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, 11 
December 2001 
26 COM(2001) 745 final: Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, 11 
December 2001, pages 26-27. Articles 81 and 82 EC are the new Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU 
27 COM (2014) 449 final, European Commission’s White Paper: “Towards more effective EU merger 
control, Brussels, 9.7.2014, paragraph 43 
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According to the EC Merger Regulation paragraph 2328, it has to be established if 
concentrations with a Community dimension are compatible with the common market, or 
if they are outside the terms of the need to maintain and develop effective competition in 
the common market. The Commission’s appraisal needs to be placed within the general 
framework of the achievement of the fundamental objectives referred to in Article 2 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 3 of the Treaty on European 
Union. 
According to the Article 2 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, its mission 
(among several others) is to: 
“Promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and 
sustainable development of economic activities, sustainable and non-
inflationary growth a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of 
economic performance and economic and social cohesion and solidarity 
among Member States.” 
When talking about acquisitions of minority shareholdings, I do not see that they would 
threaten the harmonious and balanced development of economy – neither the sustainable 
growth of competitiveness, nor the economic solidarity and cohesion among Member 
States. As one of the stakeholders stated in public consultation, the White Paper is only 
addressing “technicalities” instead of a complete overhaul of the merger control system. So 
in my opinion this is not a topic that is essential to EC Merger Regulation29. 
Article 3 section 3 of the Treaty on European Union the European (Maastricht Treaty) 
Community’s task (among several others) is to establish an internal market which shall: 
“Work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market 
economy” 
Some enterprises’ minority shares in other firms certainly do not threaten the balanced 
economic growth or create unstable prices or prevent the creation of competitive social 
                                                 
28 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, on the Control of Concentration Between 
Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) OJ (2004) L 24/1 
29 ICC Comments on the EU White Paper on Merger Control, 225/779, 3 October 2014, page 2 
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market economy. In EC Merger Regulation paragraph 3630, the Commission recognizes 
that the Community respects the fundamental rights of the European Union and that the EC 
Merger Regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to these fundamental 
rights. This opinion was little aggravated, and of course there are lot of concerns behind 
the proposals of the White Paper and some of them should be tangled in. Still, we need to 
ask if the Commission is using adequate tools to untangle these concerns or if there are 
more appropriate and adequate ways to deal with the acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings.  
Joaquín Almunia, the competition commissioner of the European Commission, has 
exposed the rationale behind merger control in his speech in 2011 and stated that cases 
where competition concerns arise are a minority. As statistically 9 out of 10 mergers have 
been approved without conditions and during two decade there has been 274 notified 
mergers which the Commission has intervened 16 and only one has been prohibited. He 
also stated there are issues in the acquisitions of minority shareholdings and that the 
Commission is looking at an enforcement gap to solve the problem. Almunia stated that “I 
have instructed my services to look into this issue and see whether it is significant enough 
for us to try and close this gap in EU merger control”.31 
The next year, in Cernabbio,  Almunia introduced new modifications to be made for the 
EU Merger Regulation. The first was the Simplified Merger Procedure, whose weaknesses 
I will focus on chapter 6.2. Almunia also raised the concern of the acquisition of non-
controlling minority shareholdings which, on his opinion, may sometimes cause significant 
harm to competition and which the Commission is unable to handle within the current 
merger control system. Almunia also states that "any reform would have to strike the right 
balance between effective enforcement and the need to keep the regulatory burden light" 
and proposed a selective system that identifies the cases which raise competition 
problems.32 
 
 
                                                 
30 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, on the Control of Concentration Between 
Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) OJ (2004) L 24/1 
31 J. Almunia, EU merger control has come of age, Brussels, 10 March 2011, SPEECH 2011/166 
32 J. Almunia, Merger review: past evolutions and future prospects, Cernobbio, 2 November 2012, 
SPEECH 2012/773 
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3. Control in concentrations 
 
When talking about the concept of control in concentrations here, we are talking about the 
control contained in the EC Merger Regulation, since there are also other possible 
definitions of control – established by national authorities in accordance with the 
legislation applicable in each Member State33. According to the Commission the concept of 
control under the Merger Regulation may be different from that applied in specific areas of 
legislation concerning, for example prudential rules, taxation, transport or the media34. 
Therefore I will focus on the definition of control within the meaning of the EC Merger 
Regulation. 
 
 Concentrations 3.1.
 
As defined in the EC Merger Regulation paragraph 2035, a concentration concerns 
operations that bring about a lasting change in the control of the undertakings concerned, 
and therefore, in the structure of the market. Concentration also covers joint ventures 
performing on a lasting basis and series of transactions that are closely connected within a 
reasonably short period of time. Nowadays, the EC Merger Regulation only applies to 
concentrations that are defined as acquisitions of control by one or more person(s) or 
undertaking(s) over one or more other undertakings or parts of undertakings.36 One 
example could be a firm acquiring a majority stake in another firm or joint venture created 
by two firms. 
In order to discuss concentration as defined by the EC Merger Regulation, changes in 
control have to be on a lasting basis. Acquisition of control can happen on a legal basis (de 
jure) or on actual basis (de facto). We are talking about a Union Dimension on 
                                                 
33 Navarro et al 2005, page 27 
34 Commission Notice on the concept of concentration 1998, paragraph 17 
35 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, on the Control of Concentration Between 
Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) OJ (2004) L 24/1 
36 SWD(2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, paragraph 19 
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concentration when the control has borne and certain turnover thresholds37 are met. “The 
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to examine concentrations meeting certain turnover 
thresholds in order to assess whether they lead to a significant impediment of effective 
competition in the internal market or a substantive part of it.”38 EC Merger Regulation 
only applies to a Union Dimension39 concentrations. Before the treaty of Lisbon, 
equivalent term was Community Dimension.40 Even though the transactions would not be 
large enough to reach the turnover threshold, mergers can still be subject to national 
merger regimes, as most of them utilize the EC Merger Regulations concentration test41. 
The idea of Union Dimension is based on the evaluation of the threshold of the parties. 
When it looks at thresholds, the Commission is not trying to evaluate the market situation 
of the parties of the concentration or its effects to competition, but trying to technically 
define its jurisdiction to investigate the concentration. This principle has been defined in 
the Cementbouw case, where it is said that: “the Commission would become involved only 
where the proposed concentration — or the concentration already carried out — attains a 
certain economic size and geographic scope, that is to say, a 'Community dimension'. 42  
EC Merger Regulation paragraph 11 requires that upon the exceeding of a given threshold, 
the undertakings should have substantial operation in the Community, a requirement that in 
fact has had no impact in practice. The requirement of Union dimension seems to be 
fulfilled in practice when the aggregate turnover of the undertakings exceeds given 
thresholds. With the Union Dimension, based on certain turnover thresholds, the 
Commission is trying to set up clear and unambiguous threshold to avoid the legal 
uncertainty. The determination of turnover thresholds is pretty easy and unambiguous in 
practice. The other side – and at the same time the weakness – is the mechanical 
application of the Union Dimension. This mechanical application, with no possible 
competition effects or only little effect, is being investigated within EC Merger Regulation. 
                                                 
37 Article 1(2) of the EC Merger regulation: A concentration has a Community dimension where: (a) the 
combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 5000 million; 
and (b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each at least two of the undertakings concerned is more 
than EUR 250 million. 
38 SWD(2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, paragraph 19 
39 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, on the Control of Concentration Between 
Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) OJ (2004) L 24/1, paragraph 9 
40 Leivo et al 2012, pages 985-986 
41 Reynolds – Anderson 200, page 1 
42 Case T-282/02 Cementbouw Handel & Industrie BV v Commission, 23.3.2006, section 115 
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Nevertheless concentration with Union Dimension has to be notified to the Commission 
before execution of the merger.   
Definition of the Union Dimension has three different turnover thresholds: worldwide, 
Union-wide and Member State - wide.43 
Article 3(5) of the EC Merger Regulation44 lists exceptions for operations that fall under 
the scope of Article 3(1) as concentrations but are deemed not to result in a concentration, 
such as: 
(i) Acquisition of securities by financial institutions or insurance companies 
provided that the voting rights in respect of the securities are not exercised to 
determine the competitive behaviour of the undertaking and that the securities 
are sold within one year; 
(ii) the acquisition of control by office-holder; and  
(iii) the acquisition of securities by financial holding companies as defined by 
Article 5(3) of Fourth and Seventh Company Law Directives45 provided  that 
voting rights are used only to maintain the full value of the investment and not 
to determine the competitive conduct of the undertaking.  
These are called operations which are not concentrations. Purely financial agreements such 
as sale and leaseback agreements with a buyback of the assets neither constitute a 
concentration since they do not change control over the management.46 
 
 Concept of Control 3.2.
 
One of the defining characteristics of control is the capability of exercising decisive 
influence.47 It is not necessary to prove that parties are actually using this decisive 
                                                 
43 Leivo et al 2012, pages 1053-1054 
44 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1) 
45 Council Directive 78/660/EEC of July 25, 1978 on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, OJ L 
222 of 1978, and Council Directive 84/569/EEC on consolidated accounts OJ L 314 of 1984 
46 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), paragraph 19, see also Giro – Ezrachi 
2008, page 335 
47 Leivo et al 2012, page 997 
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influence or that they are about to48, but the ability to wield it must be proven.49 When 
talking about minority shareholding, such shareholdings are considered to be under 
ECMR, if under circumstances defined above in this section, the Commission refers, in its 
notice, to the possibility of establishing control through qualified minority50. Article 3(1) of 
the EC Merger Regulation specifies that control may also be acquired by any other means. 
Concentration may arise by factual or legal basis. The control itself can be sole or joint, 
and its acquisition can concern one or several companies or parts of the companies. 51 The 
concept of control is specified in the Article 3(2) of the EC Merger Regulation: 
Control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which, either 
separately or in combination and having regards to the considerations of fact or law 
involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking in 
particular by: 
(a) ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; 
(b) rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the composition, 
voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking.” 52 
This set up the basic frames inside which the Commission is operating while reviewing the 
transactions. 
 
 Conclusive Control 3.3.
 
EC Merger regulation does not define exactly the concept of the Conclusive Control which 
is determinant when estimating the concentrations53. In most of the cases the possibility to 
exercise the decisive influence is based on majority ownership of the shares or on the 
special rights gained through shareholders agreement concerning, for example the strategic 
                                                 
48 Cook –Kerse, p. 31 
49 Case T-282/02 Cementbouw Handel & Industrie BV v Commission, 23.3.2006, section 58 
50 Commission Notice on the Notion of Concentration 1994, section 14. It is notable that the qualified 
majority was already noticed in the EEC Merger Regulation 1989 
51 Hukkinen – Troberg 2012, page 322 
52 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, 2 January, 2004: On the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, Article 3 section 2 
53 Hukkinen – Troberg 2012, page 322 
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decision-making of the target company.54 The control can be sole or joint control and both 
of them can appear on a legal or actual basis. Appraisal of the Commission is always made 
on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 Sole Control (Legal or actual, negative or positive) 3.3.1
 
Sole control occurs when only one undertaking is exercising its decisive influence on the 
target undertaking. When one undertaking is using its decisive influence in deciding on a 
strategic commercial decision of the target undertaking this is known as positive control. 
Usually it is based on the major ownership of shares of the target undertaking, which 
expresses itself through a majority of the voting shareholders convened at a general 
meeting. Negative sole control denotes a situation in which one undertaking has the power 
to prevent the strategic decision-making in the target company, but does not have the 
power on its own, to impose such a decision. In most of the cases this is based on veto 
rights gained through shareholders agreements.55 The negative sole control situation is 
called deadlock56: Company is the sole owner of that position and it does not have to co-
operate with other shareholders.57 
A typical situation involving legal sole control is when an undertaking acquires a majority 
of the voting rights of another undertaking in a general meeting. Sole control may also 
occur on a legal basis when specific rights are attached to the minority shareholding58. If, 
according to the articles of association of the undertaking, A stipulated majority is needed 
for the strategic decision-making, the acquisition of simple majority does not give rights 
for strategic decision making (positive sole control) but instead allows the acquirer to 
block such decisions (negative sole legal control).59 
Sole control can also be gained by acquiring minority shareholding, for example, in 
following cases: 
                                                 
54 Leivo et al 2012, page 997 
55 Leivo et al 2012, pages 1002-1003 
56 More of the deadlock situation in clause 0 
57 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), paragraph 54 
58 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), paragraph 57 
59 Leivo et al 2012, page 1005 
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- Different class of shares: The undertaking has different kinds of share 
classes, where various shares are worth different amounts of votes at a 
general meeting. A minority shareholder can, by acquiring a sufficient 
number of shares with the majority of voting rights, assume the power to 
decide on the strategic decisions such as nomination over half of the 
board of directors. 
- Right to decide over operations in long course: A minority shareholder 
can also use sole control when it has the right to lead the company 
operations and decide on them in long course. 
- Minor participation in the general meetings: Minor participation of 
shareholders in general meetings can lead to a situation where it is very 
likely that undertaking will have majority of votes in the general meeting 
even though it does not have majority of the votes. 
- Convertible promissory note: A convertible promissory note or other 
agreement through which the minority shareholder can, in a short time, 
change its position in the management or ownership of the undertaking so 
that it can overtake legal control over target60.61 
Minority shareholder can also gain the control through swap option, put option or call 
option. With these contractual stipulations, a minority shareholder can, rather quickly, 
acquire the majority of shares of the target undertaking. These stipulations are not, by 
themselves, enough to initiate sole control.62 An example of the actual sole control is the 
case RTL/M663, in which RTL gained actual sole control when Suez, the other shareholder 
of M6, sold its shares to a large group of investors, leaving the RTL, the only user of actual 
sole control, no other choice than to notify the concentration to the Commission even 
though it did not take part to the acquisition. 
De facto sole control occurs when a minority shareholder has control over another 
undertaking because it has significant shareholding in it and the remaining shares are 
dispersed. The minority shareholder establishes de facto controls the decision-making of 
                                                 
60 In the case IV/M.397 Ford/Hertz, 7.3.1994 the Commission ruled that 49 % shareholding with possibility 
to nominate four out of nine board members and certain veto-rights lead to the possibility to use conclusive 
control. 
61 Leivo et al 2012, pages 1005-1006 
62 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), paragraph 60 
63 More of  the case COMP/M.3330 RTL/M6, 12.3.2004 in section 3.4 
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the target by controlling the majority of the votes at annual meetings. In this situation the 
minority shareholder exercises decisive influence over the target.64 The control by de facto 
means can exist in the following situations: 
- Insignificant participation in the general shareholders meetings: De facto 
control can be analyzed through the development of participating shareholders in 
the general meetings in last three (or more) years. The percentage of the vote 
needed to adopt the resolutions can be determined through analysis and the results 
can show whether minority shareholding is sufficient to confer control.65 However 
the Commission cannot conclude that the control exists – if, for example, one 
shareholder has had majority in general meetings over the last three years – but it 
can be a decisive evidence of the existence of control. 
- Composition of shareholders: When there are a lot of individual shareholders 
with small shareholding in the undertaking, the composition of shareholding needs 
to be viewed to determine whether one of the minority shareholders could, in 
theory, have significant influence in decision making in the target undertaking.66 
 
 Joint Control 3.3.2
 
According to the Jurisdictional Notice paragraph 62, “Joint control exists where two or 
more undertakings or persons have the possibility of exercising decisive influence over 
another undertaking.” Decisive influence in joint control cases is described as “the power 
to block actions which determine the strategic commercial behaviour of an undertaking.“ 
(Negative Joint Control).  
Joint Control often leads to a possible deadlock situation67 when two or more undertakings 
reject such proposed decisions.68 These shareholders have to co-operate and reach common 
understanding in the decision-making of the target undertaking. 
                                                 
64 Navarro et al 2005, page 22 
65 Minority shareholding has been considered sufficient to confer control in following cases: IV/M343 
Société Générale de Belgique/Générale de Banque 1993 (25,96 %); IV/M613 Jefferson Smurfit Group plc / 
Munksjo AB 1995 (29,04 %); COMP/M2574 Pirelli/Edizione/Olivetti/Telecom Italia 2001 (27 %) 
66 Navarro et al 2005, pages 23-24 
67 More of the deadlock mechanism in clause 0 
68 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), paragraph 62 
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Joint control can also be legal (de jure) or actual (de facto). Usually, the legal joint control 
is based on certain veto rights defined in shareholder agreements. Joint Control can very 
rarely be based on actual circumstances. One example could be when the minority 
shareholders have such significant common interest that they are actually prevented from 
acting against each other when using voting rights in the target undertaking. Recognition of 
actual joint control is very hard and the Commission has also stated in Jurisdictional Notice 
paragraph 76 that: “The greater the number of parent companies involved in such a joint 
venture, however, the more remote is the likelihood of this situation occurring.”69  The 
Commission has stated in its practice70 that Actual Joint Control occurs when undertakings 
have exercised decisive influence on the target undertaking. 71 
Acquisition of joint control leads more often to a notification of the concentration than 
acquisition of sole control, because the turnover thresholds that count are based on the 
number of participants of the concentration. Turnover of the target undertaking can be 
rather small but very often the acquirers joint turnover meet the thresholds.72 To be able to 
examine the turnover threshold, we first need to determine the concerned undertakings. 
Friend has provided an example of a joint venture situation that can cause problems when 
talking about undertakings is concerned: “An example of a joint venture in which only 
some of the shareholders have joint control, while others are simply regarded as passive 
minority investors (albeit with minority protection rights). There may be perfectly sound 
business reasons why the transaction is structured in this way that have nothing to do with 
merger control “avoidance”; for example, reflecting the investment mandate of a pension 
fund which is prevented from playing an active role in management, or the fact that certain 
of the investors have particular sector expertise or are making a larger investment, and 
therefore want to have a more direct role in management.”73 
As we shall see below the Jurisdictional Notice draws a distinction between veto rights 
over vital strategic business decisions and those that are not regarded as conferring control. 
According to the Friend it is not clear which undertakings should be taken into account 
while counting the turnover thresholds and at least some of the non-controlling 
                                                 
69 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), paragraph 76 
70 More of the Actual Joint Control, see cases COMP/JV.55 Hutschinson/RCPM/ECT, 3.7.2001 and 
IV/M.967 KLM/Air UK, 22.9.1997 
71 Leivo et al 2012, page 1009 
72 Leivo et al 2012, page 1014 
73 Friend 2012, page 304 
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shareholders would need to be taken into account while determining whether the Merger 
Regulation applies or not74. 
To be able to apply the EC Merger Control we have to distinguish between acquisition of 
joint control in concentration and establishment of joint venture. In order to review the 
established joint venture under EC Merger Control it has to be a full function joint venture. 
In acquisition of joint control in concentration, it is sufficient that the target is a business in 
which certain threshold gain from the market can be directed. 75 
One or more undertaking with minority shareholding in the same entity can also enjoy 
specific rights, e.g. virtue of article of association or an agreement between parent 
undertakings, which compensates the shareholders by providing an avenue to exercise joint 
control with each other. Usually these take the form of veto rights that allow the minority 
parent undertaking to block the decision-making of the joint venture.76 Even if one 
undertaking holds a sufficient amount of shares to exercise sole control, joint control may 
arise as the results of the veto rights of the minority shareholder. Normally these veto 
rights are exercised at the shareholders meeting and in the administrative or supervisory 
bodies where a minimum quorum is needed in order to pass vital decisions.77 Such vital 
decisions78 are: 
- Business plan: Veto rights over the business plan may confer joint control and 
contrary lack of a veto right on this point can itself determine the absence of joint 
control. 
- Approval of budget: Budget determines the future of commercial strategy of the 
undertaking, so veto rights over the approval of budget may confer joint control. 
- Appointment of senior management: Appointment of senior management 
(chairman, managing director, general directors) of the joint venture is important 
element although it is not decisive in its own79. Nevertheless important point over 
here is the power of the parent undertakings to block appointments to these posts. 
                                                 
74 Friend 2012, page 305 
75 Leivo et al 2012, pages 1025-1026 
76 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), clause 3.2 
77 Navarro et al 2005, page 16 
78 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), clause 3.2 
79 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), clause 3.2 
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- Other veto rights: Regarding e.g. investments, changes in the scope of the activity 
of the joint venture, restructurings of joint ventures, and other specific rights over 
which undertakings can exercise power through veto rights, although not decisive. 
- Casting vote and deadlock mechanisms: Generally the joint control, when one of 
the parent undertakings is having a casting vote, may exist very rarely. It could 
exist when the casting vote could only be used after all the stages in arbitrations or 
attempts at reconciliation have been exhausted or if it were used in a very limited 
field.80 These are certainly an exception. 
Over all the most important veto rights, which refers to the existence of joint control, are 
approval of business plan and budget and the appointment of senior management. Overall 
the joint control between minority shareholders does not result from the veto rights but 
from an agreement between two or more minority shareholders to pool their voting 
rights.81 Minority shareholders of the joint venture can exercise their voting rights through 
a holding company to which the minority shareholders transfer their rights82. 
The existence of joint control by two minority shareholders can, in some exceptional cases, 
be taken into account even when they are not bound by any agreement that obliges them to 
act jointly. This kind of joint control occurs as a result of concerted actions of minority 
shareholders who are obliged for economic reasons to take concerted actions even though 
they do not mutually prejudice their interests. This kind of joint control, which is purely 
factual, requires exhaustive investigative efforts and is very exceptional.83 The 
Commission has declared following indicators of common interest that lead to a joint 
control of joint venture on de facto basis:84 
- Previous existence of connections between minority shareholders or the acquisition 
of shares through concerted actions; 
- Concerted actions in newly created joint venture (It is likely that the parent 
companies intentionally operate a joint policy); and 
- Existence of a small number of parent companies. 
                                                 
80 Commission Notice on the concept of concentration 1998, paragraph 37 
81 Navarro et al 2005, pages 17-21 
82 IV/M330, McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann, 1993, paragraph 48 
83 Navarro et al 2005, pages 24 
84 COMP/IV/JV12 Ericsson/Nokia/Psion/Motorola, Commission decision of 20th November 1998 
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The Commission usually uses de facto joint control as supporting evidence of the existence 
of such control. 85 
 
3.3.2.1 Shifting alliances and Dead lock mechanism 
 
Shifting Alliances. If in the target undertaking, which is owned by more than two 
shareholders, none of the shareholders has a right to make (positive control) or block 
(negative control) strategic commercial decisions, the assumption is that none of the 
shareholders is using control. These situations are called Shifting Alliances or Changing 
Majorities.86 For example, in an undertaking in which there are three shareholders and 
each owns a third of the share capital, each shareholder may nominate a different board 
member to the same seat, since there is no clear majority amongst them, the shareholders 
do not have joint control.87 Since it is not possible to determine ex ante which of these 
shareholders has the power to pass such decisions, they do not form a concentration within 
the meaning of the ECMR88. Joint Control could, in this situation, only occur when two of 
the shareholders would have significant common interest to vote in the same way (e.g. 
family relations).89 
Dead Lock mechanism. In Dead Lock situations, actions determining the strategic 
commercial behaviour of an undertaking are blocked by a minority shareholder.90 There 
cannot be a joint control if one of the shareholders, by himself, is able to make the strategic 
commercial decisions of the target undertaking. If this power has been significantly 
limited, e.g. with a shareholders agreement, in a way that minority shareholders would 
have the power to dispute the decision in arbitration, which in practice would delay the 
implementation of the decisions. This kind of a dead lock-mechanism can lead to a joint 
control. 91 
                                                 
85 Navaro et al 2005, page 25 
86 The Commission also uses terms Variable Majorities and Chancing Coalitions in the Case T-282/02 
Cementbouw Handel & Industrie BV v Commission, 23.2.2006, sections 27 and 60 
87 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), paragraph 80 
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89 Leivo et al 2012, pages 1012-1013 
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91 Leivo et al 2012, page 1013 
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 Acquisition of control 3.4.
 
As explained in section 3.1 a concentration shall be deemed to arise where a change of 
control on a lasting basis92and possibility to exercise decisive influence is real.93 Control 
can be acquired by following means: 
- Acquisition of sole or joint control in the target undertaking in which has not have 
users of control before; 
- Transformation from sole to joint control; 
- Transformation from joint to sole control and 
- Increasing number of the shareholders using the joint control.94 
Control can also be gained without active actions due to legal acts of the other 
shareholders, as in the case RTL/ M6 where in the beginning, RTL held 48,4 % and Suez 
37,6 %, the two holding joint control over M6. Suez sold 29,2 % of its shareholding in M6 
to a large number of investors through a public placement, leaving the RTL as the major 
holder of sole control. Despite the fact that RTL has not acquired any additional shares in 
M6, the divestment of Suez’s shares led to the passive acquisition of sole control by RTL 
and the company had to notify the concentration to the Commission in 2004.95 
Acquirer of the control is defined in Article 3 (3) of the EC Merger Regulation96: 
“Control is acquired by persons or undertakings which: 
(a) are holders of the rights or entitled to rights under the contracts concerned; or 
(b) while not being holders of such rights or entitled to rights under such contracts, 
have the power to exercise the rights deriving therefrom.” 
Target of the acquisition has to be whole or parts of one or more undertaking. This is often 
very simple when commercial assets (including production, immaterial property and 
                                                 
92 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, 2 January, 2004: On the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, Article 3 (1) 
93 Case T-282/02 Cementbouw Handel & INdustrive BV v Commission, 23.2.2006 
94 Leivo et al 2012, page 1014 
95 COMP/M.3330 RTL/M6, Commission decision 12 March 2014. 
96 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, 2 January, 2004: On the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, Article 3 (3) 
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employees) are been divided from the seller and transferred to the buyer. If the target is 
only a part of the seller’s property, it can be questioned whether OR NOT SUCH ASSETS 
ARE a concentration in the meaning of the Article 3(1) of the Merger Regulation. 
According to the Jurisdictional Notice: “The acquisition of control over assets can only be 
considered a concentration if those assets constitute the whole or part of an undertaking, 
i.e. a business with a market presence, to which a market turnover can be clearly 
attributed.”97 Transfer of immaterial rights or licensing of such rights, transfer of the 
customers and outsourcing of business are at least acquisitions of part of the business.98 
 
 Change of control on lasting basis 3.5.
 
As defined earlier and in Article 3(1) of the EC Merger Regulation, changes of control 
have to be on a lasting basis in the structure of markets also, as defined in paragraph 20 of 
the EC Merger Regulation99, which normally is the situation when acquiring a business. 
The concept of lasting basis has gained expansive interpretation in practice. Fixed-term 
transactions are not excluded by the fact that the agreements are entered into for a definite 
period of time, provided they are renewable and the period envisaged is sufficiently 
long.100 
Parties of the concentration can also cancel the merger, and if certain criteria are met the 
acquirer of control can avoid the consequences.101 
 
 Passive control 3.6.
 
When a controlling shareholder of the undertaking invests in to its competitor, the potential 
unilateral and coordinated anticompetitive effects are pretty similar to those involving 
                                                 
97 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), paragraph 24 
98 Leivo et al 2012, pages 1021-1022 
99 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, 2 January, 2004: On the control of concentrations between 
undertakings 
100 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2014 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2008/C 95/1), paragraph 28 
101 More of the abandonment of concentration see DG Competition information note on Art. 6 (1) c 2nd 
sentence of Regulation 139/2004 (abandonment of concentrations)  
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passive investment among the rivals themselves. The controlling shareholder partly 
identify with the profits and losses of the rival undertaking and the controller tends to make 
his own undertaking compete less vigorously102. Anticompetitive effects are much stronger 
the lower the controller’s stake in his own firm103. This is because the lower the 
controller’s stake in his own undertaking is, the more weight the controller places on his 
minority stake in the rival undertaking, and the less vigorously the controller tends to 
manage his own undertaking. 104 
Passive investments by controlling shareholders are often ignored when measuring 
anticompetitive effects. This was the case in Nordbanken/Postgirot105, where Nordbanken, 
a large Swedish bank, held a significant shareholding in Bankgirot, the only competing 
undertaking of Postgirot from which the Nordbanken was planning to acquire a minority. 
The Commission ruled that such an arrangement could seriously reduce competition 
between the only undertakings in the giro industry in Sweden, so Nordbanken had to 
reduce its shareholding to no more than 10 % in Bankgirot. 
Nevertheless, the Commission states in the White Paper that anti-competitive effects may 
materialize whether the minority shareholding is passive or active.106 
As a result, the White Paper states that an undertaking with a minority stake in a 
competitor will have less incentive to compete vigorously, so it will tend to reduce its 
competitive pressure, which leads to increasing prices and reduction of output in markets. 
This may occur whether or not the minority shareholder has influence on the target’s 
decision (passive control) or the minority shareholder has some influence on the target’s 
decision making (active control).107 
In proposed targeted transparency system, the acquisitions of minority shareholdings 
should be reported to Commission if the purchasing company acquires influence in the 
decision-making of the target company. This would mean that this kind of passive minority 
shareholding would still not fall into the scope of the proposed system, so it would not 
work in the way the Commission intends it to. This seems to beg the question, therefore: 
                                                 
102 Gilo – Moshe – Spiegel 2006, pages 81-99 
103 Gilo – Moshe – Spiegel 2006, pages 81-99 
104 Ezrachi – Gilo 2006, page 333 
105 COMP/M.2567 Nordbanken/Postgirot 
106  COM (2014) 449 final, European Commission’s White Paper: “Towards more effective EU merger 
control, Brussels, 9.7.2014, paragraph 29 
107 SWD(2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
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what use is the targeted transparency system if it still cannot capture the possible passive 
transactions, which seems to be the most problematic from the Commission’s point of 
view? 
According to the Commission, the potential anti-competitive effects of minority 
shareholding is made active when the acquirer has a power to approve certain strategies in 
the shareholders’ meeting in relation to significant investments, product lines, geographical 
scope, capital-raising, and engaging in mergers and acquisitions. Practice proves that 
competitive concerns are more serious when a minority shareholding is granted some 
degree of influence over its target’s decisions. I will focus more on the cases of acquisition 
of active minority shareholding in chapters 5.1 - 5.4.108 
 
4. How are the acquisitions of shareholdings and minority shareholdings 
legislated today in EU 
 
Acquisitions of shareholdings and minority shareholdings are all subject to the ECMR and 
Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. Minority shareholdings that give rise to control or 
decisive influence are the ones which need regulatory review because they might 
materially affect competition so they are reviewed under the ECMR. In case the acquisition 
of minority shareholding does not give rise to control or decisive influence so that the 
merger could be reviewed under ECMR, the merger is subject to ex-post review under 
Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.109 
The Commission has stated in the White Paper that the Articles 101 and 102 TFEU may 
not be suitable for dealing with anti-competitive minority shareholdings110. In this chapter, 
I will focus on the anti-competitive effects of acquisitions and see if Articles 101 and 102 
can be used and if they have been used to solve the possible concerns of anti-competitive 
effects on the acquisitions of minority shareholdings. 
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Three of the Member States of the EU (Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom) are 
already empowered to investigate the acquisitions of minority shareholdings within their 
national legislation and in their territories111. I will focus more on the procedure these 
countries have chosen in the chapter 7. 
 
 Anti-Competitive Effects 4.1.
 
One way to systematize mergers is to pay attention to the competitive concerns which they 
raise. We are talking about unilateral or non-coordinated anticompetitive effects which are 
born when undertakings have sole control to restrict the competition without contribution 
of the other undertakings as well as coordinated anticompetitive effects that are created 
when two or more undertakings have the kind of interdependence that restrains them from 
competing. 112 
In practice, anticompetitive effects depend on a number of factors that significantly 
influence the undertakings incentive to compete. These factors can be structural (“e.g. the 
degree of market concentration, entry conditions, the homogenous or differentiated nature 
of the products concerned, the substitutability of the products concerned, their respective 
diversion ratios and the number of companies in the market which are linked to each 
other”) or they can be transaction specific (“e.g., the companies’ respective costs and 
margins, their market shares, the size of the minority interest and the reciprocal nature of 
the structural links”). Additional factors that need to be taken into account are the data 
relating to the target that can affect the acquirer’s decision-making, conflicting incentives 
for management, the acquirer’s ability to capture benefits from its minority shareholding 
and the degree of control over the target’s decisions. 113 
Acquisition of minority shareholding in the competitor can cause anticompetitive effects 
when the acquirer gains ability to effect the targets competition behaviour. Control can be 
acquired through the usage of voting rights e.g. right to name executive board members of 
the target undertaking. This kind of control can cause the restriction of competition 
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because the acquirer can, through its control, make the target undertaking compete less 
aggressively or raise collusion between competitors.114 
Passive investment can cause anticompetitive effects especially in concentrated, 
oligopolistic markets115 , if the parties involved are strategic players in the market and the 
magnitude of passive investment is large enough.116 As in oligopolistic markets where 
there are only few significant players, consumer price is usually above the marginal cost of 
supplying products or services.117 
Passive investments can lead either a collusive outcome in the market (co-ordinated 
effects) or a lessening of competition between the competitors (unilateral effects). 118 Such 
investments may enable undertakings unilaterally to raise prices even absent explicit 
collusion or tacitly (unilateral effects), or they may facilitate explicit or tacit collusion 
between competitors (coordinated effects) 119 
When one undertaking owns a share of its competitor, the losses of the target affects the 
value of the investment of the minority shareholder and can cause losses to the minority 
shareholder as well. In these circumstances the minority shareholder may have to compete 
less intensively with its target undertaking. The acquirers may lessen the intensity of their 
competition with the target undertaking, even though the acquirer does not have the power 
to influence the target undertakings competitive behaviour. 120 
Acquisition of minority shareholding in the competitor can also work as a barrier to entry 
into the markets. The Commission has determined that minority shareholding could be 
abused in a way that would debar smaller competitor from acquiring target undertaking, 
which would thereby enhance the competitive pressure on the market. Minority 
shareholding in the competitor can also debar third parties entry to the capital of the target 
undertaking through acquisition. 121 
It has been shown in economic studies that minority ownership between actual competitors 
can lead to anti-competitive effects which can be harmful for the fair competition. Minority 
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shareholdings in a competitor can also have efficiency-enhancing effects. As with so many 
other things in the field of competition law, this is not so black and white. So instead of 
just concentrating on the possible anti-competitive effects, competition authorities should 
be aware of these effects and review them in light of the enhanced efficiencies that may be 
generated by minority shareholding.122 
 
4.1.1 Non-coordinated or Unilateral anti-competitive effects 
 
According to Reynolds and Snapp123, the unilateral effects of minority shareholdings with 
high-entry barriers and structural interdependence between undertakings might lead to 
unilateral reductions of output and could increase prices to the detriment of consumer 
welfare. This structural effect is the consequence of the acquirer´s ability to gain profit 
from rivals it owns a minority share of as a result of unilateral output restrictions. The 
losses incurred can be recovered through a minority shareholding of the target undertaking, 
so the acquirer can actually turn the losses to profits.124 
Even though minority shareholding between competitors can have unilateral anti-
competitive effects, this does not necessarily mean that these effects will be present or 
substantive.125 Two methodologies have been suggested to measure the anticompetitive 
effects of horizontal mergers – the MHHI126 and PPI127 indexes.  These deal with unilateral 
competitive effects due to a merger, when concentration creates the ability to profitably 
raise prices even though the other undertakings would not follow their example. Passive 
investments have no unilateral effects when the market is perfectly competitive. The only 
effect of such investment would then be the facilitation of collusion.128 
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In horizontal mergers, unilateral anticompetitive effects exist when one undertaking gains 
dominant position or strengthen its already dominant position. Unilateral anticompetitive 
effects also arise in gap-cases in oligopolistic markets. This means situations where 
withdrawal of the competitive pressure due to a merger can lead to a situation where 
concentration can unilaterally raise prices even though it is not the biggest actor in the 
market and the merger does not arise or strengthen the dominant position. 129 
In vertical mergers, unilateral anticompetitive effects exist mainly in two ways. If the 
concentration has dominant position in the upstream market, it can debar competitors in the 
downstream market by refusing to supply essential inputs or by raising their prices. If the 
concentration has dominant position in the downstream market (ie., it is big purchaser of 
the inputs or significant distributor) it can debar competitors in the upstream markets by 
refusing to purchase from them or lessen purchasing.130 
Unilateral effects may, in minority shareholdings, change the payoffs for the undertakings 
involved, or lessen their incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement or engage in a 
pricing war to punish deviations from a collusive agreement. Investments in a competitor 
may also signal to the rest of the market that the undertaking has intention to compete less 
vigorously. This may induce all of the undertakings in the industry to reduce competition 
and favor a collusive balance to the detriment of consumers. 131 
 
4.1.2 Coordinated anti-competitive effects 
 
Coordinated anti-competitive effects in acquisitions of minority shareholdings may also 
arise when market participants will gain ability and incentive to explicitly or tacitly 
coordinate competition in order to achieve supra-competitive profits.132 Explicitly 
coordinated effects are less likely because of the fear of intervention by competition 
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authority but tacit collusion is a threat in industry fields where there is a limited number of 
significant undertakings133. 
Tacit collusion refers to a situation where cartel-like prices are sustainable without 
communication between the undertakings. Each undertaking may refrain from cutting a 
collusive price out of the fear that this would cause a price war. Such war could involve 
long-term losses which may reduce the short-term profits of the price-cutting undertaking. 
Unlike cases of explicit collusion, it is very difficult for competition authorities to detect or 
prove tacit collusion. 134 
Because of its nature, collusion is difficult to sustain. It is enough that for at least one 
undertaking the short-term profit during a price cut outweighs the long-term losses from a 
price war that would cause tacit collusion to cease. When other undertakings become 
aware that one firm is eager to cut prices, collusion may not be sustainable. Even the 
undertakings that prefer collusion to price-cutting would prefer not to be undercut by a 
rival. This takes us to conclusion that passive investment may facilitate tacit collusion, 
since when investing in a rival in an oligopolistic market, the investor may become less 
eager to price cut on a collusive price. This is because it would absorb a portion of the 
rivals’ losses from this price-cut. 135 
It is important to notice that passive investment among rivals in oligopolistic market will 
not always facilitate collusion. Unilateral passive investment facilitates collusion only 
when the investment IS made by the undertaking most eager to price-cut. Such an 
undertaking is called an Industry Maverick. When non-maverick undertakings are the only 
ones in the market investing in rivals, their passive investment has no effect on the stability 
of collusion because it gives its competitors no incentive to price-cut.136 Some 
undertakings have more influence on the competition than their market shares shows. A 
merger involving a maverick may change the dynamics of competition in a significant anti-
competitive way, especially in oligopolistic markets. The undertaking may, for example, 
be a recent entrant in the markets that is expected to exert significant competitive pressure 
on the other undertakings in the market in the future.137 The analysis reveals that passive 
                                                 
133 Ezrachi – Gilo 2006, page 331 
134 Tirole 1988, chapter 6 
135 Ezrachi – Gilo 2006, page 331 
136 Ezrachi – Gilo 2006, page 332 
137 Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2004, paragraph 37 
33 
 
investment by industry mavericks raise competitive concerns due to the coordinated 
anticompetitive effects.138 
Some markets can be structured in a way that undertakings would consider it possible, 
economically reasonable and preferable to adopt on a sustainable basis a course of action at 
selling at increased prices on the aimed market. A merger in an oligopolistic market may 
significantly impede effective competition by creating or strengthening dominant position, 
because it would increase the likelihood that undertakings are able to coordinate their 
market behaviour and raise prices, even without entering into an agreement or resorting to 
a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (101 of the TFEU). A merger may 
also make coordination more stable, easier or effective for undertakings already in 
dominant position, either by making the coordination more powerful or by permitting 
undertakings to coordinate on even higher prices.139 
All different kind of mergers (horizontal, vertical and conglomerate) can cause coordinated 
anticompetitive effects.140Acquisition of minority shareholding can lessen the competition 
in three ways: 
1. It can lessen the competition by giving the acquirer the ability to influence the 
competitive conduct of the target undertaking; 
2. It can reduce the incentive of the acquirer to compete; and 
3. It can give the acquirer access to the non-public competitively sensitive information 
of the target undertaking.141 
Prevailing balance in the market can falter because the undertakings are co-operating 
through the knowledge gained from minority shareholdings142. This can create uncertainty 
over the upcoming market behaviour of competitors. This is how undertakings can foresee 
each other’s behaviour in the market and adjust their strategies to their competitor´s, which 
prevent the effective and real competition in the markets143. Minority shareholdings can 
prevent such undertakings incentive to differ from the agreed co-operation or from start a 
price war to punish those who have not followed the agreed-upon arrangements. 
Investments in the competitors can send a message to the relevant markets that their 
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incentive is not to compete so aggressively, which can reduce the incentive to compete and 
support the achievement of collusive balance within competitors and cause harm to 
consumers. Coordinated anti-competitive effects can also arise when one undertaking 
acquires passive minority shareholding from its competitor if the target is rival in the 
markets and the arrival is expected to cause significant market pressure in the future (the 
so-called maverick).144 
 
 Minority Shareholdings 4.2.
 
As stated in the section 1.1, minority shareholding refers to a situation in which a 
shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the voting rights of another undertaking. However 
it does not necessarily indicate whether the holder of such minority stake is entitled to 
exercise control over the target undertaking or otherwise influence its business conduct.145 
The Commission is concerned with "structural links" between competitors that could lead 
to competitive harm in following manners: 
- “by reducing competitive pressure between competitors ("horizontal unilateral 
effects"); 
- by substantially facilitating coordination among competitors ("horizontal 
coordinated effects"); 
- in case of vertical structural links by allowing companies to hamper competitors' 
access to inputs or customers ("vertical effects").”146 
In some minority shareholding acquisition cases, the withholding of input may be more 
likely after control is acquired, since the acquirer only internalizes a part of the target’s 
profits when it receives the full benefit of such a withholding. According to the 
Commission, competition concerns are limited when the acquirer has no influence on the 
target company’s decisions (passive minority shareholding). On the other hand, when the 
minority shareholding is active and the acquirer has some influence on the target 
company’s decisions, the risk of foreclosure can be higher than with a fully-integrated 
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firm.147 The Commission concentrated on the input foreclosure in IPIC / MAN Ferrostaal 
case148, which I will go through in section 5.4. 
OECD’s Competition Committee has paid attention to the minority shareholdings and their 
possible anti-competitive effects in roundtable discussions in 2008. The conclusion of the 
discussion was that minority shareholding can have negative effects on competition, either 
by facilitating collusion (coordinated effects) or by reducing the minority shareholder’s 
incentive to compete (unilateral effects) 149. In some cases, the minority shareholding can 
result in less production and higher prices. This can be seen when the financial losses 
incurred by the acquired competitor affects the value of the investment of undertaking that 
owns a part in a competitor. It is clear that such an undertaking has less incentive to 
compete against the company it has investigated in and the undertaking has incentive to 
unilaterally reduce output and raise prices if it is in a position to recoup part of the lost 
sales through its investment in the competitor.150 
OECD: “The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
was established in 1948 to run the US-financed Marshall Plan for 
reconstruction of a continent ravaged by war. OECD brings around its table 
40 countries that account for 80% of world trade and investment, giving it a 
pivotal role in addressing the challenges facing the world economy. OECD's 
work is based on continued monitoring of events in member countries as well 
as outside OECD area, and includes regular projections of short and 
medium-term economic developments. The OECD Secretariat collects and 
analyses data, after which committees discuss policy regarding this 
information, the Council makes decisions, and then governments implement 
recommendations.”151 
At the moment, the Commission only has the power to investigate acquisitions of control 
and already existing minority shareholdings related to the notifications of acquisition of 
full control. The Commission states that if the minority stakes is acquired after the 
examination of the acquisition of full control, it does not have the competence to 
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investigate this kind of cases. 152 An example of the already existing minority shareholding 
is the Thyssen/Krupp153 merger, in which Krupp held a 10 % minority stake and certain 
contractual rights (structural links154) in its competitor, Kone. Since the parties were 
competing in an oligopolistic market, the Commission cleared the merger only after Krupp 
undertook to waive the exercise of its rights in Kone.155 
In one noteworthy case, a conflict within the ECMR law was discovered when the 
Commission viewed an already finalized merger of dominant position and demanding 
remedies. The merger between Tetra AND Sidel156  had already been finalized when the 
Commission found that the merger created a dominant position in the market and ordered 
Tetra to divest its ownership in Sidel, according to the Article 8(4) of the ECMR. Under 
this provision, the Commission was empowered to require the undertakings to dissolve the 
already implemented concentration. Tetra argued that it should be allowed to retain 
minority interest in Sidel,  and that in this particular case the retention of the minority stake 
did not require notification under the ECMR so the Commission would not have 
jurisdiction under Article 8(4) of the ECMR to order divestiture of such interest. The 
Commission disagreed and ruled that the purpose of the Article 8(4) was to restore 
conditions of effective competition. In the end, Tetra was not able to retain minority 
shareholding in Sidel.157 
When minority shareholdings are found to have anticompetitive effects, competition 
authorities can use structural remedies to eliminate competitive concerns. Generally, these 
remedies seek to reduce or eliminate certain shareholder rights or interests, as can be seen 
in the practice in section 5. Competition authorities have very rarely accepted behavioural 
remedies such as firewalls, which are not so common due to a high monitoring cost and 
doubts of effectiveness.158 
According to the OECD roundtable discussions, there are four categories of remedies that 
competition authorities may consider to eliminate anticompetitive effects of minority 
shareholding: 
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1. “The divestiture of the acquired shares or part of the shares and the severance of 
the structural link between the competing firms; 
2. The waiver of the rights linked to the minority shareholding, such as representation 
rights on the board, veto rights and information rights; 
3. The creation of a so-called “firewall” between the firms in order to prevent the 
flow of sensitive information between them; and 
4. The elimination of interlocking directorates, when the shareholder has the right to 
appoint board members of the target company and, as a result, one or more board 
members become members of the boards of both companies.”159 
In roundtable discussions, competition authorities have expressed a preference for 
structural remedies over behavioural remedies. In their opinion, behavioural remedies 
should only be allowed when they satisfactorily eliminate the anticompetitive effects, if 
there is no structural remedy and NO or only minimal monitoring is required.160 
Interlocking directorates occure when one or more persons have responsibilities in two 
or more competitors. These can raise competition concerns because directors in common 
can become conduits for information exchange between competing undertakings and 
facilitate coordination. They can also lead to foreclosure of rivals. Some countries prohibit 
certain interlocking directorates in their merger regulation.161 
 
 Article 101 of TFEU 4.3.
 
Article 101 of TFEU forbids the restriction of competition, the so called cartel prohibition. 
Application of Article 101 on restrictive agreements to the acquisitions of minority 
shareholding does not depend on the acquisition of control or material influence over the 
target, which is the case with ECMR. There are several reasons why the Article 101 has 
not been applied to minority shareholdings. According to the OECD’s roundtable 
discussions162, it is difficult to establish anticompetitive agreement. One example which 
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the Commission named in the White Paper163 is the acquisitions of shares via the stock 
exchange. It may be difficult to argue that the different purchase agreements meet the 
criteria of Article 101 TFEU. It may also be difficult to show the actual or highly likely 
anticompetitive effects. After all, it is not clear whether acquiring a minority shareholding 
would constitute an “agreement” affecting the object or restricting competition in all 
cases164.165 
We still have to keep in mind that Article 101 of the TFEU has been used to block the 
acquisitions of minority shareholdings even before the merger control came into force in 
1989, as it did in the Philip Morris Cases166 which I introduced in section 2. Why did the 
Commission not cite this case in its White Paper, especially if the Philipp Morris standard 
seems to be satisfactory to these situations? This would need a further debate rather than 
the Commission just denying the application of the Article 101 of the TFEU167. 
There have also been cases in which an acquisition of minority shareholding was aborted 
following an intervention by the Commission under Article 81 (nowadays 101 of the 
TFEU). In 1994, Dresser Industries, Ingersoll-Rand, General Electric and Nuovo Pignone 
gave notification of the proposed acquisition by Dresser and Ingersoll-Rand of a minority 
shareholding in Nuovo Pignone of a stake of 12 % each from General Electric. Dresser and 
Ingersoll were direct competitors of Nuovo Pignone through their joint venture companies. 
Both of them withdrew their planned acquisition following an intervention by the 
Commission under Article 81 (Nowadays 101 of the TFEU).168 
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 Article 102 of TFEU 4.4.
 
Article 102 of the TFEU forbids the abuse of dominant position. Generally it is said that 
dominant undertakings are less likely to invest in competitors. They still may invest in 
competitors to discipline them and ensures that incentives to compete are reduced.169 The 
Commission’s White Paper says, “In order for the Commission to intervene using Article 
102 TFEU, the acquirer of the minority shareholding would need to hold a dominant 
position, and the acquisition would need to constitute an abuse.” 170 That is why 
Commission sees that it possibility to investigate acquisition of minority shareholdings via 
Article 102 of the TFEU is quite narrow. 
Nevertheless, in Warner-Lambert/Gillette-case171, the Commission found Article 102 (82) 
applicable to the acquisition by a dominant firm of minority shareholdings which did not 
confer decisive control over the target. The Commission held that Gillette’s acquisition of 
22 % of Warner-Lambert, its competitor in the wet-shaving market in Europe, was in 
violation to Article 102 (82) of TFEU – notwithstanding the fact that the 22 % stake gave 
Gillette no voting rights or board representation.172 
When dealing with acquisitions of minority shareholdings under Article 102 of the TFEU, 
the question of whether a dominant position has been established is a primary concern.173 
If such transactions are not covered under Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, they will 
require oversight under the EC Merger Regulation. 
 
 The EC Merger Regulation No 139 / 2004 4.5.
 
According to the ECMR paragraph 21, “Articles 81(101) and 82(102), while applicable to 
certain concentrations, are not sufficient to control all operations which may prove to be 
incompatible with the system of undistorted competition envisaged in the Treaty.” 
Therefore the EC Merger Regulation is most frequently used to examine the competitive 
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effects of mergers in general and also the acquisitions of minority shareholdings in some 
cases. As discussed earlier in clause 3.2 the ECMR uses the concept of Control to 
determine whether a transaction is to be reviewed; it can only be reviewed if it results in a 
change of control. This may create the risk of an enforcement gap in cases when the 
acquisition of minority shareholding do not affect control but may have anti-competitive 
effects.  
When reviewing acquisitions of minority shareholdings we have to distinguish between 
two different kinds of acquisitions. Pre-existing non-controlling minority shareholdings 
related to a notification of a different concentration is already covered by the 
Commission174. This leaves us with a second option – pure acquisition of minority 
shareholding not related to any other transaction. 
The Commission only has jurisdiction to review the acquisition of minority shareholding in 
cases in which the acquirer exercises control over the target (active minority shareholding). 
ECMR does not give the Commission jurisdiction to review if minority shareholding does 
not result in changes in control (passive minority shareholding). As already noted in 
section 3.2, the concentration may occur on a legal basis or de facto basis, and it may take 
the form of sole or joint control175.  
ECMR regulations may apply if changes in the quality of control (from joint to sole and 
vice versa) creates new shareholders – whether they replace the existing controlling 
shareholders or not – and also if such changes reduce of the number of controlling 
shareholders176. The Commission has clarified the EC Merger Regulation in 2008 with a 
Jurisdictional Notice177 that works as an excellent guidebook to interpreting the ECMR. 
The purpose of this Jurisdictional Notice is to provide guidance on issues related to the EC 
Merger Regulation. According to the Jurisdictional Notice paragraph 1: “formal guidance 
should enable firms to establish more quickly in advance of any contact with the 
Commission, whether and to what extent their operations may be covered by Community 
control of concentrations”. Jurisdictional Notice deals with the concept of concentration 
and explains joint ventures, undertakings concerned and the calculation methods of 
turnover thresholds in details. 
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There is no prescribed minimum level of shareholding over which the acquisitions of 
minority shareholdings would necessitate oversight by the ECMR178. Therefore it can be 
said that there is a certain enforcement gap which the Commission is trying to block with 
the propositions of the White Paper.179  
That the Commission can affect acquisitions of minority shareholding has been 
demonstrated by recent history. For example, in Schneider/Légrand case180 the 
Commission prevented Schneider from keeping its 98,1 % stake in Légrand, one of its 
competitors in a highly concentrated market. The Commission analyzed that an increase in 
the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) of less than 100 points would allow Schneider to 
maintain a stake of less than 5 % of the Légrand´s shares. This suggested that acquisition 
of minority shareholding would not result in an HHI increase of less than 100 points 
(which in this case was less than 5 % stake) and thus would not be a cause of concern to 
the Commission. This is a good example of how the Commission’s jurisdiction has 
overseen acquisitions of minority shareholdings.181 
 
4.5.1 Pre-notification and full notification 
 
Form CO and Short Form CO are forms of the notification which are used to notify the 
concentration that it is subject to oversight by the Commission under EC Merger 
Regulation.182 Concentrations which are unlikely to pose competition concerns can be 
notified with Short Form CO, which requires less information about the relevant markets. 
Parties of the concentration can also make a pre-notification which is based on voluntarily 
when the Commission can take actions of the formal merger review procedure.  According 
to the Commission, pre-notification can be advantageous to the notifying parties, since it 
can result in a significant reduction of the information required. By acting pre-emptively, 
the acquirer may submit less information to the Commission than is required under full 
notification. The process of pre-notification is an essential concept in my thesis, since it is 
unclear what the circumstances are that cause acquirers of minority shareholding to receive 
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notification. Currently, parties are caught in the position of having to make a pre-
notification, just in case if the White Paper reforms should come to pass.183 
 
 SIEC-test 4.6.
 
Once the Commission receives notification from an enterprise, it begins to investigate 
whether that concentration is compatible with the common markets or not. According to 
the EC Merger Regulation the concentration is compatible if the concentration does not: 
“Significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part 
of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position”184. 
This SIEC (Significant Impediment to Effective Competition) test is the defining threshold 
through which the Commission assesses the concentration’s effects on competition. Within 
this framework, the Commission can assess whether the concentration is compatible with 
the common market in light of Article 101 of the Treaty. The Commission moved from 
Dominance test to SIEC test in 2004. The SIEC test broadened the Commission’s 
jurisdiction to intervene in mergers that significantly impede the effective competition in 
common markets but do not create or strengthen dominant position.185 
The introduction of the SIEC test in 2004 also enabled the Commission to review non-
coordinated effects of transactions in cases when the merged entity would not acquire a 
dominant position. 186 The Commission has, under the EC Merger Regulation, exclusive 
jurisdiction to examine concentrations that meet certain turnover thresholds, to assess 
whether they could lead to a significant impediment of effective competition in the internal 
market or a substantial part of it.187 
The SIEC test and other methods used by the Commission to analyze mergers are inherent 
in the more economic approach in that they try to directly assess the extent to which 
                                                 
183 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, on the Control of Concentration Between 
Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) OJ (2004) L 24/1, Annex I, page 2 
184 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004of January 2004 on the Control of Concentration Between 
Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) OJ (2004) L 24/1, Article 2 
185 Leivo et al 2012, pages 1125 - 1126 
186 COM (2014) 449 final, European Commission’s White Paper: “Towards more effective EU merger 
control, Brussels, 9.7.2014, paragraph 78 
187 SWD(2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, paragraph 18 
43 
 
competition would be lost as a result of a merger. This kind of approach does not have to 
work with a market definition. Therefore, the SIEC test represents a much truer reflection 
of economic reality than the simple black-and-white definitions of relevant products and 
geographic markets. Nevertheless relevant products and geographic markets are still 
important indicators, especially in homogenous products, because market shares can still 
tell a lot about the restriction of competition in the light of Article 101 of TFEU, and 
markets still need to be defined for the assessment of dominance under the Article 102 of 
the TFEU.188 
 
 Theories of Harm 4.7.
 
There are several types of competition concerns that arise when a minority shareholding is 
acquired. These are based on theories of harm similar to those relevant to acquisitions of 
control, and in general require that the transaction significantly increase market power.189 
Acquiring a minority shareholding in a competitor may lead to non-coordinated anti-
competitive effects because such a shareholding may increase the acquirer’s incentive and 
ability to unilaterally raise prices or restrict output.190 
The Commission’s Staff Working Document states that competitive harm on acquisitions 
of minority shareholdings may arise from access to a competitor’s confidential business 
information, or from the influence acquired over strategic decisions of a competitor191. The 
Commission justifies this proposition by arguing that the targeted transparency system 
would not have any impact on small and medium sized enterprises because the jurisdiction 
of the Commission would only be triggered if the turnover thresholds192 are met.193 
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 Efficiency-enhancing effects 4.8.
 
Minority shareholdings can also gain efficiency effects that can be truly beneficial for the 
undertakings involved, the market and, most importantly, for the consumers. Sometimes 
mergers do increase competiveness in the relevant industry markets, can improve the 
conditions of growth and are in the line with the requirements of dynamic competition. The 
efficiencies brought by such mergers counteract the anticompetitive effects and the 
potential harm to consumers that they might otherwise have. The Commission makes a 
competitive appraisal of the merger to assess whether it would significantly impede 
effective competition by strengthening a dominant position. In doing so, the Commission 
takes into account the factors mentioned in Article 2(1) of the ECMR, including economic 
progress provided that it is to the consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to 
competition.194 
When sufficient evidence can be found that the merger is likely to enhance the ability and 
incentive of the concentration to act competitively for the benefit of consumers, the 
Commission may, because of such efficiencies, declare that there are no grounds on the 
basis of the Article 2(3) of the ECMR to declare the merger incompatible with the common 
market.195 
According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, there are three factors that need to be 
fulfilled in order that the Commission may approve such a merger. The efficiencies need 
to: 
− Benefit consumers: Consumers should not be in worse situation because of the 
merger; 
− Be merger-specific: Efficiencies are direct consequence of the merger and they 
cannot  be achieved by less anticompetitive alternatives; and 
− Be verifiable: Efficiencies are likely to materialize and counteract a merger's 
potential harm to consumers.196 
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These criteria also relate to the acquisitions of minority shareholdings. When all these 
factors are fulfilled at the same time, the Commission might approve an anti-competitive 
merger that it otherwise would have prohibited. 
Usually the competition authorities get curious when one undertaking acquires one of its 
main competitors in the same industry sector, since such a merger would significantly 
reduce competition in the affected markets. But what if the target undertaking is near a 
bankruptcy? Could the parties then argue that since the target would exit the market 
anyway, the acquisition would not reduce competition, since the target would not have 
remained as competition to the acquirer? This defense is called "failing firm" which has 
been considered acceptable in the UK and France.197 
According to the Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, it may decide that a 
problematic merger is compatible in the market if one of the merging parties is a failing 
firm but the situation cannot be a consequence of the said merger198. The Commission 
specifies three conditions that all must be satisfied so that the failing firm defense can be 
accepted: 
− Failing firm, if not acquired by another undertaking, would be forced out of the 
market in the near future because of financial difficulties; 
− There is no alternative purchase that would be less anti-competitive than the said 
merger; and 
− Failing firms assets would inevitably exit the market.199 
Under these circumstances, the Commission might accept an acquisition that otherwise 
would raise such anti-competitive concerns that it could not be accepted. What would be 
the value of the failing firm defense in the situation of acquisition of minority 
shareholdings to proposed targeted transparency system if it would pass? 
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5. Cases concerning mergers and attempted mergers of minority 
shareholding 
 
Cross investments are very common in the automobile, air travel, banking, car rental and 
energy industries200. Based on cases on which it has ruled dealing with acquisitions on 
minority shareholdings, The Commission has focused on three factors the acquirer might 
possess: a minority power to block, a seat on the board of directors, and access to 
commercially sensitive information belonging to the target. Any of these can lead to anti-
competitive effects in acquisitions of minority shareholding. I will focus on how the 
Commission has dealt with these possible harmful effects in cases where it reviewed 
acquisition of minority shareholding. 
Here are some cases in which the Commission has taken account of the divestment of 
minority shareholdings or the abandonment of interlocking directorship in first-phase 
decisions, rendering unnecessary an analysis of the potentially complex issues arising from 
the assessment201: 
 
 Ryanair / Aer Lingus 5.1.
 
This series of attempted acquisitions is one of the most influential cases behind the 
proposals of White Paper. Activity between Ryanair and Aer Lingus and the perceived 
need to have the targeted transparency system in place has been the Commission’s biggest 
concern. The story begins in 2006, when Ryanair acquired 19 % shareholding of its 
competitor, Aer Lingus, the former Irish national flag carrier. This required no notification 
under the ECMR, since the stake was not big enough to confer a control202. In November 
2006, Ryan Air raised its interest to 25 % and after receiving notification of the 
acquisition, the Commission prohibited the acquisition in June 2007 due to a competition 
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concerns203. Ryanair appealed this decision but the General Court sustained the 
prohibition204. Overall, this decision is not that important within the present thesis, but it 
should be mentioned that the Court fully endorsed the Commission’s assessment and its 
conclusion was that the decision entailed solid prohibition205. Meanwhile, after the 
decision, the UK’s national competition authority, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), 
commenced an independent investigation while Ryanair’s appeal on the Commission 
decision was still ongoing . The ECMR provides a “one-stop shop” for merger control at 
EU level which can be read from Article 1(1) of the ECMR: “Regulation shall apply to all 
concentrations with a Community dimension”. According to the Article 21(3) of the 
ECMR: “No Member State shall apply its national legislation on competition to any 
concentration that has a Community dimension” This means that when there is a conflict 
between EU and national law, EU law, in this case ECMR, shall prevail. By these means 
the OFT was required to desist from making any reference to the UK’s Competition 
Commission when the Appeal to the First Court was still ongoing, so the OFT has to stop 
its investigations.206  
Aer Lingus appealed to the General Court, arguing that the Commission, in ordering 
Ryanair to divest its controlling shareholding based on Article 8(4) of the ECMR and 
Ryanair, should have ordered a complete divestiture of all shareholdings, even the 
remaining 29,4 %. The General Court dismissed Aer Lingus’ motion on the basis that the 
acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholding did not constitute a merger within the 
meaning of the ECMR.207 
So Ryanair retained its 29,4 % shareholding in Aer Lingus and a second attempt to take 
control over Aer Lingus occurred in July 2012, which the Commission likewise blocked in 
February 2013.208  The UK’s Competition Commission informed Ryanair and Aer Lingus 
that it would continue its investigation and rejected Ryanair’s contention that the 
investigation should be halted because it infringed the ECMR’s exclusive jurisdiction for 
merger control. Ryanair appealed the decision and the Competition Appeals Tribunal and 
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Court of Appeal dismissed their application, saying this Ryanair’s second attempt to 
acquire Aer Lingus after its first attempt had been blocked by the Commission.209 
Nevertheless, Ryanair refused to divest its shareholdings in Aer Lingus and the case went 
to the General Court. The General Court confirmed that Ryanair did not have to divest 210 
After this decision Ryanair increased its possession to 29,8 %. 
Since the Commission did not have the power to force Ryanair to reduce its holdings, the 
UK’s Competition Commission began examining the case on the basis of the UK merger 
control rules. Such jurisdictions are triggered by different merger control tests.211 The UK 
merger control rules allow for a review of minority interest in acquisitions based on 
material influence, we shall examine in section 7.2. (ECMR is based on decisive 
influence.) 
In August 2013 the UK Competition Commission forced Ryanair to reduce its 
shareholding from 29,8 % to 5 %, arguing that these holdings gave Ryanair the ability to 
influence Aer Lingus’ commercial policy and strategy. This was significant, because at the 
time, Aer Lingus was Ryanair’s main competitor on flights between the UK and Ireland. 
The matter was appealed and the Competition Appeal Tribunal sustained the decision212. 
This case is one of the main reasons the Commission has pushed for a targeted 
transparency system. UK authorities were able to review only the routes to and out of the 
UK – however, there would were still many other routes between EU Member States that 
would have fallen under the scope of the proposed system, but UK authorities were not 
able to look at them.213 
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 Toshiba / Westinghouse 5.2.
 
In the Toshiba/Westinghouse case214  the Commission’s concern focused on Toshiba’s 
joint venture with one of Westinghouse’s most important competitors, GNF. Toshiba had 
numerous board and management members in common with GNF and its subsidiaries, 
which gave them both veto rights and the opportunity to obtain sensitive confidential 
information. The Commission ruled that Toshiba had to relinquish all of its board and 
management representation in GNF, its veto rights and all rights to obtain any confidential 
information before it could acquire Westinghouse.215 
 
 Siemens / VA tech 5.3.
 
The Commission’s decision216 concerning the acquisition of Austrian VA Tech by Siemens 
raised the issues of harm and influence and voting rights gained. A horizontal overlap 
existed between Siemens and SMS Demag, with Siemens holding a non-controlling 28 % 
minority shareholding in SMS, one of VA Tech’s subsidiaries.  “Certain information, 
consultation and voting rights were granted to Siemens by SMS Demag’s shareholders’ 
agreement.” According to the Commission, the merger would reduce competition in the 
metal plant-building market because of a combination of information rights and financial 
incentives stemming from Siemens’ shareholding in SMS Demag.217 
Due to Siemens’ access to commercially-sensitive information of VA tech through the 
ownership in SMS Demag – a subsidiaries of VA Tech – the Commission held that the 
acquisition produced non-coordinated competition effects. Eventually, Siemens had to 
reduce its positions in SMS Demag in order for the Commission to accept its acquisition of 
VA Tech. 
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 IPIC / MAN Ferrostaal 5.4.
 
As stated in section 4.2, the IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal218 transaction gave rise to a foreclosure 
risk. Acquisition was approved by the Commission subject to certain conditions. 
International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) attempted to acquire MAN Ferrostaal, 
a subsidiary of MAN and owners of the only non-proprietary technology for melamine 
production in the world. 
IPIC’s subsidiary, AMI, was the major producer of melamine and together with DSM and 
MAN Ferrostaal had a 30 % minority shareholding in Eurotecnica, a supplier of the input 
technology in the industry. A minority stake of 30 % gave MAN Ferrostaal significant 
influence on the decision-making procedures of Eurotecnica’s engineering and melamine 
licensing business. Because several decisions had to be made by super-majority according 
to the shareholders agreement, the merger gave all shareholders broad information rights. 
According to the Commission, this arrangement was likely to substantially deter the 
licensing practice for customers of Eurotecnica, since the information exchanged between 
a prospective client and Eurotecnica (due to a shareholders agreement) might end up in the 
hands of the client’s competitor – in this case, AMI. Thus, a foreclosure strategy towards 
new entrants and DSM for the production of melamine could be expected.  
The Commission also noticed that due to a high concentration of market participants (two 
producers with the same market shares – DSM and AMI) and the transparent nature of the 
markets (well-known costs and published agreement prices), there was an increased risk of 
co-ordination between market leaders DSM and AMI. Therefore, the Commission placed 
remedies and MAN Ferrostaal had to commit to divest its entire shareholding in 
Eurotecnica.219 
Overall, it can be said that the Commission can view acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings to a significant extent. The question then is, is this enough to satisfy the 
Commission’s mandate or should its jurisdiction to capture acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings been extended even further? 
 
                                                 
218 COMP/M.5406 IPIC / MAN Ferrostaal, Commission decision of 3 of March 2009 
219 SWD(2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, paragraph 32 
51 
 
6. Propositions of White Paper 
 
In order to prevent harm to consumers resulting from acquisitions of minority 
shareholding, the Commission is attempting to expand the scope of its Merger 
Regulation220. It has identified three221 requirements the new system should take into 
account to be truly effective in its monitoring of acquisitions of minority shareholdings: 
1. “It should capture the potentially anti-competitive acquisitions of non-controlling 
minority shareholdings; 
2. It should avoid any unnecessary and disproportionate administrative burden on 
companies, the Commission and NCAs; and 
3. It should fit with the merger control regimes currently in place at both the EU and 
national level.” 
The Commission also proposed that the same turnover thresholds which currently apply to 
the acquisitions of control also apply to the acquisition of non-controlling minority 
shareholdings. The question then is: do these turnover thresholds already apply to the 
acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings? Since these situations are not 
specially mentioned in the Merger Control regulation, they are to be treated as any other 
acquisitions; these situations, therefore, already fall into the scope of Merger regulation. 
The Commission calls this new system, which would cover the acquisitions of minority 
shareholding, a “targeted” transparency system222, which would cover all three principal 
requirements. “It would allow potentially problematic transactions to be targeted from the 
outset, namely through the identification of transactions which create a “competitively 
significant link”. 223 Competitively significant links would arise when there is a 
competitive relationship in the horizontal markets or closely related vertical markets. 
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 Competitively Significant Link 6.1.
 
To avoid legal uncertainty the Commission states that the competitively significant link 
would only arise when following criteria’s are fulfilled:” 
 Acquisitions of a minority shareholding in a competitor or vertically related 
company (i.e. there needs to be a competitive relationship between acquirer and 
target); and 
 the competitive link would be considered significant if the acquired shareholding is 
(1) around 20 % or (2) between 5 % and around 20 %, but accompanied by 
additional factors such as rights which give the acquirer a “de-facto” blocking 
minority, a seat on the board of directors or access to commercially sensitive 
information of the target. 
The parties would be required to self-assess whether a transaction creates a 
“competitively significant link” and, if so, submit an information notice.” 224 
This means that if these criteria’s are met, parties have to submit an information notice in 
advance of closing the transaction. The White Paper also proposes a waiting period of 15 
days after the pre-notification (information notice), during which the parties of the 
transaction cannot close the transaction and Member States should decide whether to 
request a referral. If the parties of the transaction do not make pre-notification as proposed 
by the White Paper proposes225, “the Commission would also be free to investigate a 
transaction, whether or not it has already been implemented, within a limited period of 
time following the information notice. Such a period could be 4 to 6 months, and would 
allow the business community to come forward with complaints.” I will focus more on the 
waiting period and to the legal uncertainty which it could create on section 8.4. 
According to the White Paper, the Commission lacks adequate tools for dealing with anti-
competitive acquisitions of minority shareholdings and therefore the proposed targeted 
transparency system should be adopted226. The Commission does not, however, expose the 
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problems behind the acquisitions of minority shareholdings and their anti-competitive 
effects effectively enough. Instead of dissecting the pros and cons, the Commission exists 
only to determine whether acquisitions of minority shareholding create anti-competitive 
effects and IF a new system should be adopted to be able to investigate them. I will focus 
more on the problematic behind the propositions of White paper in section 8. 
 
 Targeted transparency system 6.2.
 
The proposition of the targeted transparency system is that the parties would only be 
required to submit an information notice for the anti-competitive transactions instead of a 
full notification. In order to avoid the legal uncertainty the Commission proposes that the 
system would be combined with a possibility to voluntarily submit a full notification.227 
 
 What went wrong with the adoption of the Simplified Merger Procedure 6.3.
 
The purpose of the Simplified Merger Procedure228 was to streamline and make Merger 
Regulation more effective. The aim was to raise the applicable market share thresholds for 
the identification of horizontal markets from 15 % to 20 % and of vertical markets from 25 
% to 30 %. The idea was to adopt the Short Form CO, which requires less information 
from the parties of the concentration, on the basis that they generally do not raise 
competition concerns. Therefore, the Commission launched a similar consultation project 
with the White Paper in 2013, and according to the Commission, “the proposed changes 
could allow up to 70% of all notified mergers to qualify for review under the Commission's 
simplified procedure, i.e. about 10% more than today.”229  
The Commission got a lot of replies from the stakeholders and many of them were 
concerned with the new procedure and stated that rather than simplifying the procedure, 
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the new wording of the section 5.4 of the ECMR would dramatically increase the scope of 
the Commission and require even more information of the relevant markets in which the 
parties of the concentration are acting in.230 Of particular concern was one word included 
in the market definitions: the word “plausible”. This means that the parties would have to 
report what impact their concentration would have to the plausible markets, while 
notifying the concentration. It was not clear what was meant by this term, and many of the 
stakeholders asked the Commission to clarify this term in particular. Despite criticism from 
30 stakeholders in the public consultation, the Commission abided only to mention this 
concern in its Summary of Responses. 231 In December 2013 the proposed changes were 
made without alteration, a move that certainly did not create legal certainty within the 
markets.  
In general, the propositions, of the Simplified Merger Procedure were acceptable but the 
way the changes were implemented was not. We have to hope that the Commission learned 
something from this episode and will not repeat the same mistakes in its adoption of the 
White Paper.  
The White Paper states that if we want to go further than the achievements of the 
Simplified Merger Procedure, the Merger Regulation itself should be amended232. The 
Commission talks about achievements instead of the problems behind the steps towards 
more effective Merger Regulation. The way that I see it, the Commission is once again 
heading to a one direction with eyes shut instead of investigating the big picture and 
considering the tools that are already in place to ensure Merger Regulation is effective. 
As an alternative to full notification, the White Paper proposes voluntary information 
notices as a way of ensuring that information about potentially problematic transactions is 
aired. Based on the information given in the information notice, the Commission would 
then choose whether to investigate the transaction further or not.233 
Background material included in the White Paper also contains proposals to simplify the 
Merger Procedure even further by extending the transparency system to certain types of 
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simplified merger cases. Merger procedures could be exempted from the prior notification 
of cases currently falling under the simplified procedure, its scope could be defined in the 
Implementing Regulation, and the procedure of information notice in the acquisition of 
minority shareholdings could be used in a simplified merger procedure.234 
Due to the small number of the potentially problematic transactions, the Commission sees 
the costs of the targeted transparency system to be rather limited. They consist of 
preparation of the information notice, full notification (which has been introduced in 
chapter 0) and limited public enforcement costs. 235 As already mentioned in the chapter 
1.4.1, the Commission has focused only on the external costs of notification, instead of the 
internal costs, which can be significant. Such notifications can involve a huge number of 
employees of the parties of the merger and external legal and financial advisors, the costs 
of which should also be taken into account.236 
 
7. Comparative review on the treatment of the acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings in different countries 
 
There exist other jurisdictions than the EU’s whose wider jurisdictional nets may review 
acquisitions of minority shareholdings, e.g. under a material influence, or may review all 
acquisitions of an interest in another undertaking.237 Acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings are covered under merger controls in the USA, Canada and Japan. Within 
EU, the UK, Austria and Germany are able to investigate acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings because of a wider legislation than ECMR. Since the space is limited and 
USA is an important area in which several minority shareholding acquisition are handled, I 
will focus on the USA and on Germany, one of the largest economies in the EU. 
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Some other EU member states, such as the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Portugal, Romania and Spain, which currently do not have power to review acquisitions of 
minority shareholdings, have reviewed and intervened against minority shareholdings 
where these have existed prior to the time of the EU merger. Competition authorities of 
these Member States have overseen cases concerning banking, telecom and energy sectors 
and required several commitments from the boards of the target companies –, for example, 
divestments of the minority shareholding or removal of directors – before accepting these 
mergers.238 
Most of the EU Member States are supportive of the Commission’s proposal to extend the 
scope of the Merger Regulation, while private stakeholders have certain concerns on the 
high administrative burden the system would create. They also believe that a potentially 
problematic transaction may be covered under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and question 
whether the limited number of problematic transactions justifies the expansion of the 
Commission’s scope. Nevertheless, Though EU Member States are generally welcoming 
the proposals, their views of how the system should work differs a lot. Since the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Austria already have their own systems in force, these countries 
are taking exception to the proposal in favor of one that fits into their existing national 
procedural systems. The United Kingdom has a self-assessment system with a voluntary 
notification aspect, while Austria and Germany have an ex-ante control notification 
system. Each of these countries are favoring their own system and expecting a similar 
system to become binding within the EU Merger Control.239 
Envisioning a scenario in which EU jurisdiction lacks the tools to regulate anti-competitive 
acquisitions and local jurisdictions have them, some observers worry that such a division 
could undermine the objective of harmonized rulemaking and create the possibility of 
protracted scrutiny of particular shareholdings240. 
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 United States 7.1.
 
Merger Control in the United States was established for the first time in 1914 with the 
enactment into law of the Clayton Act. In the United States, minority shareholding are 
implicated under the following areas of antitrust law: 
- Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which covers agreements between companies 
- Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which governs mergers and acquisitions (along with 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Pre-merger Notification Act, which provides the antitrust 
enforcement agencies time and tools to investigate mergers before they are 
consummated.241 
In exploring indirect shareholding connections, we first need to answer the question 
whether the firms are, within the context of the Sherman Act, two separate entities or a 
single business entity. In Copperweld case242, the Supreme Court held that activity between 
a parent company and its fully-owned subsidiary is viewed as single enterprise. When 
common control is less clear, the availability of Copperweld defense is less certain. When 
the undertakings are found to be separate entities, the agencies must view whether the 
connections between undertakings will have anticompetitive effects that should be 
reviewed.243 
The Hart-Scott-Rodino-Act (HSR) requires that acquisition of voting rights that meets the 
size of certain threshold (and person threshold) must be reported to the antitrust 
enforcement agencies prior to consummation. There are several exemptions to the HSR, 
the most important of which is perhaps section (c) (9), which exempts acquisitions of less 
than 10 percent solely for the investment purposes.244 
In the United States, Merger Control is based on an SLC cap (Substantial Lessening of 
Competition).245 The system has very extensive reach so it can cover all acquisitions of 
minority shareholdings.  Because the jurisdiction of acquisitions is not premised on 
change in the control of an undertaking, the agencies are able to focus directly on the 
                                                 
241 OECD Policy Roundtable concerning minority shareholdings (2008), pages 175-176 
242 Copperweld Corp. v. independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) 
243 OECD Policy Roundtable concerning minority shareholdings (2008), page 175 
244 OECD Policy Roundtable concerning minority shareholdings (2008), page 179 
245 Leivo et al 2012, page 977 
58 
 
important substantive question of whether the acquisition of minority shareholding might 
substantially lessen competition.246 
As with the White Paper, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission pays attention to the same anti-competitive effects of minority shareholdings, 
in their Horizontal Merger Guidelines. According to the U.S. Merger Guidelines247, there 
are three principal effects which lessen competition due to a partial acquisition of a 
competitor: 
1. Giving the acquiring firm the ability to influence the competitive conduct of the 
target firm; 
2. Reducing the incentive of the acquirer to compete and; 
3. Giving the acquirer access to non-public competitively sensitive information from 
the target firm. 
These three principal effects are quite the same as those faced by the EC Merger 
Regulation, and the Commission would do well to pay attention to the American example 
before moving forward with its proposal of the targeted transparency system. 
 
 United Kingdom 7.2.
 
Acquisitions of minority shareholdings have been subject to UK merger control since 
1973. THE United Kingdom’s power to investigate acquisitions of minority shareholding 
was further established under the Enterprise Act of 2002, which established a voluntary 
notification regime. UK merger jurisdiction has three level of ownership interest, which 
are: 
1. Controlling interest: De jure control in another means over 50 % share of voting 
rights 
2. Ability to control policy: De facto control in another means shareholding less than 
50 % and the ability to control the target undertaking. 
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3. Ability to materially influence the policy of the target undertaking – the most 
interesting option, which we will focus on below.248 
As seen in option three, the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading has jurisdiction over 
acquisitions in which one undertaking acquires the ability to “materially influence” 
another, and if certain thresholds249 are met. Full Control is not equivalent with material 
influence, so acquisitions falling out of the scope of control may still fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Office of Fair Trading.250 
The material influence captures cases falling outside the EC Merger Regulation and its 
decisive influence. The jurisdictional meaning of material influence over the policy of an 
undertaking is articulated in the OFT’s EA02 Merger guidance251 in the following way: 
Shareholding of 25 % or more generally enables the acquirer to block special resolutions 
and is likely to be seen as presumptively conferring the ability materially to influence 
policy. The OFT can also examine cases where shareholding is 15 % or more to see 
whether the acquirer might be able materially influence the target undertakings policy. 
Shareholding of less than 15 % may still attract scrutiny when other factors indicate an 
ability to exercise material influence over policy.252 
One example of de facto blocking minority shareholding is the BSkyB/ITV253 in which 
BskyB, the leading UK pay-TV provider, acquired 17,9 % of the ITV. The UK 
Competition Commission found that with this share BskyB would, in practice, have the 
ability to block resolutions in ITV; this was expected to result in a substantial lessening of 
competition. The Court confirmed the Competition Commission's decision that BSkyB 
must reduce its shareholding to less than 7,5 %.254 
Another high profile case was the Ryanair/Aer Lingus-case, which we examined earlier in 
section 5.1. After the European General Court ruled that the European Commission did not 
                                                 
248 OECD Policy Roundtable concerning minority shareholdings (2008), page 165 
249 Relevant merger situation (RMS) is created if two or more enterprises have ceased to be distinct 
enterprises, and the value of the turnover in the United Kingdom of the enterprise being taken over exceeds £ 
70 million; or a result of the transaction, in relation to the supply of goods or services of any description a 25 
per cent share of supply in the UK (or a substantial part thereof) is created or enhanced. 
250 OECD Policy Roundtable concerning minority shareholdings (2008), page 10 
251 OFT Mergers – Substantive Assessment Guidance (2003) 
252 OECD Policy Roundtable concerning minority shareholdings (2008), page 166 
253 British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc v The Competition Commission & Anor [2010] EWCA Civ 2 (21 
January 2010) 
254 British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc v The Competition Commission & Anor [2010] EWCA Civ 2 (21 
January 2010) Statement on handing down of judgment on the appeals, section 9 
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have the power to require divestment of Ryanair’s minority shareholdings, that did not 
confer decisive influence for the purposes of the EC Merger Regulation. OFT started to 
investigate the merger and forced Ryanair to reduce its position in Aer Lingus to less than 
5 %. 
According to an accompanying document to the White Paper, 5 % of all mergers within the 
area of United Kingdom are reported as acquisitions of non-controlling minority 
shareholdings.255 
 
 Germany 7.3.
 
The local competition authority of the Germany Bundeskartellamt has recognized minority 
shareholding to have anti-competitive foreclosing of markets to competitors. To address 
these effects, German merger control law beginning in 1973 put into effect provisions to 
regulate acquisition of minority shareholdings. Acquisition of minority shareholding was 
now subject to merger control if certain provisions like thresholds were met and no 
exception applied.256 Transactions are subject to the Act Against Restraints of Competition 
(ACR) if, according to § 37, at least 25 % of the shares of another undertaking are acquired 
or a transaction enables one or several undertakings to directly or indirectly exercise a 
competitively significant influence on another undertaking.257 
The 25 % shareholding threshold is quite straightforward. A more complicated process, 
though, is determining whether a link between competitors gives one undertaking 
significant influence over another in a way that allows the acquirer to influence 
competitive behaviour of the target, reduce competition and cause the parties to no longer 
act independently in the market. Under German law, as within the EC Merger Control, the 
power to exercise influence can be decisive. 40 § of the ARC also allows structural 
                                                 
255 SWD(2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
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256 Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC) 35 §, as within the EC Merger Regulation ARC 37 § also 
contains the so called “banking clause” of the exclusion of acquisition of minority shareholding if the 
acquirer is credit or financial institution or an insurance company and resell the shares within a year. 
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remedies (such as divestiture of participations) but does not allow behavioural remedies, 
due to a consideration problems of the competition authority.258 
An example of the acquisition of at least 25 % of the share is the case of 
E.ON/Eschwege259, in which the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court confirmed a 
Bundeskartellamt decision to prohibit EAM Energie AG, Kassel, a firm belonging to the 
E.ON group, from acquiring 30 % share in the municipal utility Stadtwerke Eschwege 
GmbH. The Bundeskartellamt stated that the acquisition would have strengthened the 
dominant position held by E.ON group in the electricity and gas sales market.  
Another example of competitive significant interest in a competitor is the case of Mainova 
/Aschaffenburger Versorgungs AG260, where the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court 
confirmed the Bundeskartellamt’s decision to prohibit the electricity and gas provider 
Mainova AG from acquiring a 17,5 % stake in Aschaffenburger Versorgungs GmbH 
(AVG), the subsidiary of the Aschaffenburg municipal utilities. Because of information 
rights granted to Mainova AG, the likely result would have been a strengthening of the 
dominant positions of Mainova AG and AVG.261 
Minority shareholding may also be prohibited through § 1 of the ACR, which prohibits 
anticompetitive agreements if they affect trade between EU Member States. The 
Bundeskartellamt may prohibit such agreements via Article 101 of the TFEU.262 
In Germany, 10-12 % of all acquisitions are non-controlling minority shareholdings.263 The 
Commission states that 40-45 % of the cases investigated by the Bundeskartellamt in the 
21th century will have an EU dimension and that the Commission is the more appropriate 
authority to investigate these minority shareholding cases.264 
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8. Why the White Paper should not be adopted 
 
At the moment, there are three instruments that can be used to monitor acquisitions of 
minority shareholdings. These are the European Merger Regulation and Articles 101 and 
102 of the TFEU. As mentioned in section 6.2, the Commission proposes that in order to 
ensure that transactions be approved the parties involved could voluntarily make a full 
notification. This system would fight against the goals of Merger Regulation and 
Fundamental Rights by creating legal uncertainty. Passage of this proposition could give 
rise to situations in which the parties of unproblematic transactions would have to make 
pre-notification (or full notification, if they wished) just in case. These transactions are 
often very sensitive and proceed with a tight time schedule in order to achieve the best 
competitive advantage. Pre-emptive pre-notification  would create a heavy burden on 
businesses and could even derail a planned transaction by bogging it down in paperwork 
and interfering with a an undertaking’s ability to act quickly and decisively, which is so 
important in rapidly changing dynamics of the markets.. Such legal uncertainty could be 
avoided entirely if notification was required in all mergers. This might cause massive 
overload for the Commission, but at least the legal uncertainty could be avoided. 
So the question is: Should the heavy task of amending the ECMR be undertaken? Is there a 
need for reform? If yes, then the Commission should pay attention to legal certainty, 
effectiveness and completeness of the targeted transparency system. If the system is 
adopted in its current form, it runs the risk of deterring undertakings from doing business 
in the Internal Market of the EU due to a fear of overregulation. In this economic climate, 
can the EU afford to scare away important tax contributors while attempting to achieve the 
desideratum of enhancing competitiveness in global markets?265 How significant is 
competitive harm caused by the acquisitions of minority shareholdings, and is it worth the 
extra amount of work that would overburden the Commission?266 
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 Efficiencies vs. potential harm: Valuation case by case 8.1.
 
Acquisition of minority shareholding can create efficiencies in business or they can cause 
some serious harm. According to the EU Merger Regulation paragraph 29267, the 
Commission should publish guidelines on the conditions under which it may take 
efficiencies into account while assessing the concentration, because in some cases the 
efficiencies brought by the concentration might counteract the harmful effects to 
competition. That is the reason why these concentrations should be evaluated case by case, 
because the efficiencies created by mergers may counteract the harm done to competition. 
Concentration may not significantly impede effective competition in the common market 
or part of it. 
If the targeted transparency system is applied, the parties of a concentration would need to 
self-assess if their merger forms a competitively significant link. The Commission is 
already empowered to review the competitive effects of minority shareholdings within the 
already notified concentrations, so the situation would not change so much, as the 
participants are already self-assessing whether to notify the concentration or not. 
 
 Limited number of potentially problematic cases 8.2.
 
According to the Commission, approximately 12 acquisitions of minority shareholdings 
with competitively significant influence or material influence will be brought to the 
Commission’s attention, according to criteria used in the German and the UK systems. The 
Commission has conducted an analysis from the Zepryh database that lists the number, 
value and participation percentages of ownership transactions in listed companies 
registered in the EU Member States. According to their analysis, 43 acquisitions of 
minority shareholdings over a period of six years will fall into the scope of Merger 
Regulation if the targeted transparency system is put into place.268 According to the 
analysis, 12 of these cases will have to be notified in Germany, or around 28 % of all the 
acquisitions. 
                                                 
267 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, on the Control of Concentration Between 
Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) OJ (2004) L 24/1 
268 SWD(2014) 217 final: European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document White Paper, page 20-21 
64 
 
According to the EU Merger Control statistics269, more than 90 % of the investigated 
mergers are being cleared in the first appraisal phase. So is the enforcement gap so 
significant that there is actual need for a targeted transparency system? The opinion of the 
stakeholders, according to public consultation, is that many more information notices will 
be filed than are necessary, since the involved parties will wish to avoid any possible 
negative consequences270.  
 
 Acquisitions of minority shareholdings covered by 101 and 102 TFEU 8.3.
 
The function of the EC Merger Regulation is to oversee mergers in which one enterprise 
acquires the power to control another enterprise, and in which the combined enterprises 
form a functional concentration. Mergers that do not fulfill the EC Merger Regulation 
criteria but still raise competitive concerns are subject to the Article 101 and 102 TFEU.271 
The White Paper also states that within the proposed targeted transparency system the 
acquisitions of minority shareholdings remain subject to assessment under Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU, excluding ancillary restraints i.e. “restrictions directly related and necessary to 
the implementation of the concentration “272 which shall not fall into the scope of 101 and 
102 TFEU273. 
However, as the number of cases creating problematic structural links seems to be rather 
limited, the question arises if there is a reason to waste man-years of the Commission on 
adopting a new system that is already covered with legislation in force? In public hearings 
of the Commission towards more effective EU merger control business associations, law 
firms and law associations asked whether the limited number of problematic transactions 
justified the extension of the scope of the Merger regulation. These groups made the same 
                                                 
269 See EU Merger Control statistics until November 30th, 2014, retrieved on 29th of December 2014 at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf 
270 Burnside – MacGregor 2014, page 4 
271 Leivo et al 2012, page 855 
272 Article 6(1)(b) subparagraph 2 of the EC Merger Regulation 
273 COM (2014) 449 final, European Commission’s White Paper: “Towards more effective EU merger 
control, Brussels, 9.7.2014, paragraph 53 
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assertion I have made, that Articles 101 and 102 of TFEU should be used since they 
already deal with problematic transactions generally.274 
On June, 2013, the European Commission convened a public hearing on the acquisition of 
minority shareholding. The Commission’s goal was to make EU merger control more 
effective. At this hearing, many stakeholders experessed concern that the new system 
would create a burden on business compared to the limited number of cases and create a 
problematic structural link275. In accompanying documents, the Commission estimates the 
transactions that would fall into the scope of targeted transparency system would only be 
20-30 per year. Is it really reasonable to change the Merger Regulation if the effect is so 
small and truly problematic cases can already be solved by the Merger Regulation in force? 
It is already clear that it is not dominant position in itself that is harmful, but abuse of that 
position – which is already forbidden according to the Article 102 TFEU and Article 101 
TFEU, which forbid restriction of competition. From my point of view, the Commission 
should not have power over all acquisitions made within the area of EU but only those that 
represent competition concerns. Abuse of dominant position and restriction of competition 
can be and in most of the cases is truly harmful, but what about the acquisition of minority 
shareholding? If you are about to compete in a free market economy, you should be able to 
stand a certain amount of disruptive factors coming from outside of the company and if 
you are not able to compete in the markets, you will most probably lose the battle to your 
competitors. This is the whole idea on which the free market economy is based on. 
 
 Waiting period and ex ante control: Legal Uncertainty on the light of the goals of 8.4.
the EU’s Merger Regulation and its predictability 
 
The Commission also proposes a waiting period of 15 days after pre-notification, during 
which competent Member States would be able to request a referral and the Commission, 
if so wishes, can decide to initiate an investigation and request for a full notification. This 
stand-still obligation means that no implementation could be made before a clearance 
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decision, excluding acquisitions of shares via stock exchanges276or acquisitions of control 
by financial institutions277. Within this framework, the Commission proposes that it could 
also take up the case in a period of 4-6 months after the waiting period. After 6 months a 
transaction would most probably already have been implemented; still, the Commission 
could decide on interim measures to ensure that there is no exercise of special rights, and 
the acquirer would not be able to vote its shares until approval. 278 What are the benefits for 
the acquirers if they are not able to use the power which they have gained through merger 
for a half a year? This would in many cases mean that mergers would stop in the first 
phase, because of the heavy burdens of the process and legal uncertainty of the future. It is 
also hard for undertakings to self-assess whether the concentration should be notified or 
not, so the targeted transparency system would force them to notify the concentration just 
in case, which would add to the work load of an already overloaded Commission. 
 
 Preventive or subsequent jurisdiction? 8.5.
 
All of the effects cannot be taken into account in advance and therefore there are ex ante 
methods (such as Article 101 and 102 of the TFEU) to oversee  arrangements that have the 
potential to lessen or infringe the effective competition. How would the world be if 
everything would be taken into account in advance with regulation? The duty of the 
Commission is certainly not to try to capture all acquisitions made within the area of the 
EU. Heavy notification procedures would be like shooting a fly with heavy cannon, which 
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certainly is not the right way to resolve problems within the Competition law. Better to try 
to find a mutual understanding between the concerned parties279. 
 
9. Closing remarks 
 
Why should one shareholder have to suffer when the other shareholder is passive? Rather 
than punish shareholders who are active and take care of their investment, we should 
somehow try to motivate the passive shareholders to attend to their interests, in order to 
avoid the intervention of the authorities. 
The purpose of Competition law is, in the end, to protect consumers. But consumer 
protection cannot be a ”curtain” behind which the Commission can hide. The Commission 
is already using this as a weapon to strengthen its own position. The basic idea of the free 
market economy has been the ”law of supply and demand,” which determines the prices in 
the relevant markets. When one institution, in this case the Commission, takes all the 
authority, we cannot really talk about free market economy anymore but more likely  a 
planned or command economy, in which a single institution decides how the markets 
should work and regulates the market to the hilt. 
The market may also be changing as we may see from the latest Google case, in which the 
European Parliament voted to split Google into search engine and commercial parts in 
order to stop its abuse of its dominant position 280(or at least this is what the European 
Parliament has claimed). Thus far it is not the dominant position itself that has been 
restricted but the abuse of such position, as established in Article 102 of the TFEU. It 
should be questioned, then: has there been such an abuse of dominant position, and if so, 
why hasn’t the Commission followed its mandate and started to investigate it? 
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While reflecting on the roots of competition law, we might go as far as Hippocrates’ first 
oath: First do no harm. Philip Marsden also states: “Competition authorities and courts are 
trying to remove harm, without doing any harm”.281  
What will happen in the future if the propositions of the White Paper are adopted? The 
competitiveness of the EU would more likely nosedive and became a negative model for 
the world, while enterprises in the markets would move elsewhere, where they can still 
compete in a fair way and the legislation is predictable282. 
The political ambitions of the Commission can be heard too loudly in the background. The 
Commission cannot see the forest for the trees and accept the fact that the acquisition of 
minority shareholding became an issue of political authority once Ryanair was able to 
escape from its sanctions. Because of this, the Commission has begun a massive project to 
capture the acquisition of minority shareholdings in its jurisdiction, which will have fateful 
consequences in the other industry fields. The Commission wants to show its power in the 
form of new regulation which, as shown in the clause 2.2, is not the purpose of the Merger 
Regulation and Competition Law. Proposed legislation might be effective in the air traffic 
markets but how it can be implemented in the other industry fields of different products 
and services? 
The Commission will decide based on the feedback of the White Paper whether to take 
further steps towards legislative proposals to amend the Merger Regulation. 283Let us hope 
that the Commission is wise enough to take into account the concerns of the stakeholders 
and does not repeat the same mistakes as with the implementation of the simplified merger 
procedure. Law is not just something given but something that is written down based on 
the practice and common understanding, which in this case could be understood as the 
common understanding of the stakeholders of the justice and equity. As the Olaus Petri 
stated in 16th century “What is not justice and equity, cannot be considered law either” 
which from my opinion suits pretty well for the problematic behind my thesis. 
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 Required Changes to the proposals of the White Paper 9.1.
 
After all, it has to be mentioned that not all the proposed changes are inappropriate. There 
are some good ideas in the White Paper. In case the proposed targeted transparency system 
should pass, the Commission could make few improvements to make the proposed system 
more efficient, streamlined and easier to accept for the stakeholders. The Commission 
should impose a self-assessment system based on voluntary disclosure284 combined with 
clarified Horizontal and Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines and Jurisdictional Notices. 
There should be clear rules and criteria of the competitively significant link285. There 
should also be a safe harbor of shareholding, below which no information notice is 
required. The limits set by the Commission should be extended e.g. from 20 % to 25 %286 
and from 5 % with additional factors to 10 -15 %287. Otherwise, the proposed system 
would regulate too large a scale of mergers and target those that do not raise competition 
concerns at all and only create more duty to the parties of the merger and to the 
Commission. 
The additional factors (rights which give the acquirer a “de-facto” blocking minority, a 
seat on the board of directors or access to commercially sensitive information of the 
target288) should be defined more precisely, so they are clear and understandable to 
stakeholders. The term “commercially sensitive information” should also be clarified to 
avoid uncertainty. It should be noticed that the Commission is already investigate sharing 
of such information between the parties under Article 101 of the TFEU even without the 
acquisition of minority shareholding289. Therefore, one could be easily question the 
purpose of such additional factors as access to the commercial sensitive information. If the 
Commission wants to put a new system into place, it should first check its already existing 
toolkit to avoid unnecessary expansions of jurisdiction. 
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There should be no possibility of ex ante control (proposed period of 4 to 6 months), when 
the Commission would be free to investigate a transaction, provided that the acquirer has 
informed the transaction to the Commission290. If the Commission had such jurisdiction to 
ex ante control, it would be burdensome to businesses and create unnecessary legal 
uncertainty over the markets. 
 
 Clarification to the Guidelines and Jurisdictional Notice needed from the 9.2.
Commission 
 
Rather than change the articles of the EC Merger Regulation, the Commission should 
clarify the guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal and Non-Horizontal Mergers and 
Jurisdictional Notice291 in a way that define more clearly how the anti-competitive 
acquisitions of minority shareholdings fall into the scope of the EC merger regulation. As 
encoded in sections 4.5 and Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU and explained in section 4.3 
and 4.4, these powers exist already and cry out for clarification. 
The Commission could derive such clarification through the practice292 which is already 
there in the field of acquisitions of minority shareholding such as have been  made with the 
efficiency effects and failing firm defense, both introduced in section 4.8, which are also 
exceptions to the principal rules.  The Commission could even adopt “Guidelines on the 
Acquisition of Minority Shareholdings” which could explain the theories of harm and 
clarify when to submit an information notice293. The Commission has mentioned that legal 
certainty can also be ensured through soft-law instruments such as guidance in measuring 
the three different options through assessment criteria294.It also mentioned in the EC 
Merger Regulations paragraph 28 that “in order to clarify and explain the Commission’s 
appraisal of concentrations under this Regulation, it is appropriate for the Commission to 
publish guidance which should provide a sound economic framework for the assessment of 
concentrations with a view to determining whether or not they may be declared compatible 
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with the common market.”295 The basic idea of the EC Merger Regulation is not to try to 
capture all the acquisitions that are been made within the area of EU but those that violate 
fair competition within the area of EU. 
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